Opening the book…

Monograph Series No. 8

Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety
by
Prof. Sigmund Freud

Authorized translation from the German
Supervised by L. Pierce Clark

Published by
The Psychoanalytic Institute
Stamford, Conn.

------------------------------------------------------------------------ Copyright 1927 ------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONTENTS

Preface I. A Definition of Inhibition and Symptom II. Symptom Formation III. The Ego IV. Infantile Zoöphobia V. Symptom Formation and the Secondary Defense of the Ego VI. The Undoing and Isolation Mechanisms in Compulsion Neurosis VII. A Further Consideration of Infantile Zoöphobia VIII. An Analysis of Fear IX. The Relation between Symptom Formation and Fear Development X. Theoretical Considerations of the Birth Trauma XI. Addenda

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Preface

Only long persuasion on the part of Dr. Clark has influenced me as to the fitness of writing a preface to this fundamental work by Freud. I am unfamiliar with American customs, and with us in Europe this sort of formal introduction is not required for the scholar may represent the master before the public; but other countries have other customs. However, more mature deliberation has finally led me to find this task both pleasant and sensible,---pleasant because it gives me the opportunity to express publicly my gratitude for a new and valuable performance, and sensible because this grateful pupil is not so badly adapted to direct the attention of the circle of scientific readers to a work, the study of which helps so much to enlarge and deepen proper theoretic understanding to master so many practical aspects of psychoanalytic activity.

This little work, seemingly so modest, is in reality an attempt by Freud to bring his views on the mechanisms of the neurotic symptom-formation in harmony with the peak of his now successfully established metapsychology. On this occasion and with unsparing rectitude he has revised all of his leading expressions as to the sources of energy of the more recent symptoms and the wherefore of their makeup; his critical spirit does not rest until it has disposed of all possible counter-arguments and when it is unsuccessful he candidly admits the temporary insolubility of the problems. This justifies my opinion, elsewhere expressed, that Freud is actually not a strict Freudian and refutes the views expressed by hostile critics as to his "orthodoxy." It may be foreseen that the same opponents can gain more important positions by assertions as to inconsequence and omission, without withdrawing their complaints as to orthodoxy. In reality the entire fabric of Freud's psychology of the neuroses, even after the strictest revision, stands essentially in full stability for only on occasion are the foundation pillars exchanged or shifted to more favorable positions.

Moreover, the other assertion, that the finer makeup of the ego psychology has destroyed the libido theory formerly erected by Freud, is absolutely false. From the beginning Freud knew how to value the importance of the ego impulses as suppressors of energy although it is only in the present work that he has succeeded in elaborating this view in detail.

I will forego any attempt to anticipate the contents of this thesis and will be content to assure the reader that the time expended in reading it will be richly repaid and will awaken the impression that the master has again presented us with a work which may be placed side by side in value with the publications of his earlier years.

S. Ferenczi (Budapest)

New York, January, 1927.

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I.

A Definition of Inhibition and Symptom

Our usage of speech permits us, in the description of pathological phenomena, to differentiate between symptoms and inhibitions, but not much value is attributed to this distinction. If cases of illness did not come to us of whom we must say that they show only inhibitions and no symptoms, and if we did not know how they came about, we should hardly be interested in discriminating between inhibition and symptom.

These two do not flourish on the same soil. Inhibition has a special relationship to function and does not necessarily indicate something pathological, for one may call the restrictions of a function inhibition of the same. Symptoms, on the other hand, signify indications of disease processes. So also may inhibition be a symptom of disease. The usage of language, then, is such that it speaks of inhibition where there is an unusual variation of the same or a new performance. In many cases it is left to one's discretion to emphasize the positive or negative side of a pathological process, and designate the result as a symptom or an inhibition. This, in all truth, is not interesting and the question with which we begin this thesis is shown to bear little fruit.

As inhibition is evidently so intimately connected with function, one may arrive at the idea of studying the different ego functions, in respect to which forms of disturbance of the same are expressed in the individual neurotic functions. For this comparative study we choose: the sexual function, eating, locomotion and occupation.

(a) The sexual function is subject to very manifold disturbances, the majority of which show the character of simple inhibitions. These may be comprehended under the head of psychic impotence. The status of normal sexual function presupposes a very complicated course, and disturbance may come about in every part. The principal stations for inhibition in men are: the turning aside of the libido at the beginning of the process (psychic frigidity); the absence of physical preparation (erection); the shortening of the act (precocious ejaculation---which may equally be described as a positive symptom); the holding back of the same (lack of ejaculation); and the absence of the psychic effect (pleasure in the orgasm). Other disturbances result from the association of the function with special conditions of perverse or fetichistic nature.

One cannot long escape the recognition of a relationship between inhibition and angst.[1] Many inhibitions are palpably a renunciation of function because in the exercise of the latter fear is developed. Direct fear of the sexual function is frequent in women. We associate it with hysteria, and also with the defensive symptom of nausea, which set in originally as a supplementary reaction to the passively experienced sexual act and appear later at the mental image of the same. A great number of compulsive behaviors are also shown as precautions and assurance against sexual experience and are therefore of phobic nature.

One does not get far in the comprehension of these matters and at most one remarks only that very different procedures are applied in the disturbance of the functions: (1) The mere absence of libido, which seems the soonest to manifest itself, which we call a pure inhibition. (2) The impairment in the execution of the function. (3) The aggravation of the same by special conditions and the modification by deviation to other objectives. (4) The prevention by safety measures. (5) The interruption through development of fear so far as its addition cannot be hindered, and finally (6), a supplementary one which protests against the disturbance and would make what has happened undone if the function could be carried out.

(b) The most common disturbance of the nutritive function is anorexia through withdrawal of the libido. Also aggravation of the appetite is often seen---a compulsion to eat motivated by fear of starving has been but little studied. As a hysterical refusal of food is the symptom of vomiting, refusal of food through fear belongs to psychotic states (delusion of poisoning).

(c) Locomotion is inhibited in many neurotic conditions through disinclination to walk and weakness on walking, while hysterical inhibition is manifested by motor palsy of the locomotor apparatus or else by some special abolition of function like abasia. Especially characteristic are difficulties of locomotion through the interposition of definite conditions, through the non-fulfilment of which fear arises (phobias).

(d) Inhibition of one's occupational activities, which comes so often to treatment as an isolated symptom, shows diminished desire for work or poor execution or reaction phenomena, as exhaustion (vertigo, vomiting) when continuation of the occupation is forced. Hysteria forces the cessation of labor through engendering organ and functional paralyses, the existence of which cannot be conjoined with execution. The compulsive neuroses disturb work through continuous diversion and through loss of time in the interpolated delays and repetitions.

We could extend this survey over other functions but could not expect to attain more thereby. We have not gone beyond the surface phenomena. Hence we resolve to take a view which makes the conception of an inhibition no longer very enigmatical. Inhibition is the expression of a functional limitation of the ego, which can come about from very different causes.

Many of the mechanisms of this renunciation of function and a general tendency to the same are well known to us. It is easy to recognize this tendency in the specialized inhibitions. If piano playing, writing and even walking are subject to neurotic inhibitions, analysis shows us the reason for the same in an over-strong erotisation of the organs involved---the fingers and the feet. We have gained the view in general that the ego function of an organ is injured if its erogeneity, its sexual significance, increases. It then behaves---if one dare make a scurrilous comparison---like a cook who will no longer work at the fireside because the man of the house enters into love relations with her. If writing which consists in letting ink flow from a tube on a piece of white paper, has assumed the symbolic significance of coitus; or when walking has become a symbolic substitute for stamping on Mother Earth, then both writing and walking will be prohibitive because it is as if one would carry out some forbidden sexual transaction. The ego renounces this function proper to it in order not to be compelled to undertake a new repression, in order to avoid a conflict with the It.

Other inhibitions follow obviously in the service of self-punishment---frequently in connection with professional activities. The ego dare not do certain things because it will use them in a manner disapproved of by the more strict super-ego. In turn the ego renounces these functions in order not to engage in a conflict with the super-ego.

The general inhibitions of the ego follow another and simple mechanism. When the ego is claimed by a psychic task of particular difficulty,---through an affliction, a grand affect-suppression, through the necessity of holding down a constantly increasing sexual fancy,---it is so deprived of disposable energy that it must retrench its supply in many directions like a speculator who has tied up his money in his enterprises. An instructive example of such an intensive general inhibition of brief duration was observed by me in a compulsive patient who fell into a paralyzing weariness of one or several days' duration on occasions which should obviously have led to an outbreak of rage. Beginning here there must be found a way to the comprehension of general inhibition through which the depressive states and the most severe of these, melancholy, characterize themselves.

In conclusion, one may say of the inhibitions that they are restrictions of the ego functions either from prudence or impoverishment of energy. It is easy to recognize now wherein inhibition differs from symptom; for symptom can be nothing more than a process within or connected with the ego.

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II.

Symptom Formation

The main features of symptom formation have long been studied and have been expressed, it is to be hoped, in an impregnable manner. The symptom is a sign and substitute of a suppressed impulse-gratification, the result of a repressive process. The repression proceeds from the ego, which, perchance in the service of the super-ego, will not coöperate in an instinct investment incited by the It. The ego through the repression makes it possible for the idea, which was the carrier of the unamiable striving, to become shut off from consciousness. Analysis often demonstrates that it remains as an unconscious formation. Thus far it is clear, but presently the unsolved difficulties begin.

Our previous descriptions of the process in repression have emphasized the result of the shutting off from consciousness, but in other respects we have left matters open to doubt. The question arises, what is the fate of the impulse activated in the It which aims at gratification? The answer is an indirect one and runs as follows: through the process of repression the anticipated desire for gratification is changed to pain. One would then confront the problem of how pain could be the result of the instinct gratification. We hope to explain the situation by the definite statement that the intentional course of the stimulus in the It fails to take place because of repression, while the ego succeeds in inhibiting or diverting the same. Then the riddle unfolds of affect-transformation by repression. We have, however, confessed to the ego that it can express so far reaching an influence on the processes in the It and we should learn to understand in what way this astounding unfolding of power becomes possible.

I believe that this influence belongs to the ego as a result of its intimate associations with the perceptive system, which indeed constitutes its very nature and is the basis of its differentiation from the It. The function of this system, which we have called the perceptive-conscious, is bound up with the phenomenon of consciousness; it receives excitations not only from without but also from within and by means of pleasure-pain sensations which it attains therefrom it attempts to direct all of the courses of the psychic happenings in accordance with the pleasure principle. We imagine the ego as good as powerless against the It, but when it strives against an instinctive process in the It, it needs only to give the signal of pain in order to attain its objective through the almost omnipotent factor of the pleasure principle. When we contemplate this situation by itself for the moment we may illustrate it by an example from another sphere of activity. A certain clique resists a measure which meets with the inclinations of the mass of the people. This minority then usurps the press, manipulates through it the sovereign "public opinion" and pushes matters in such a way that the planned measure does not go through.

Other questions now arise. Where does the energy originate which brings about the pain signal? Here an idea shows us the way the defence of an unwished for process within may follow the pattern of a defence against an external irritant, where the ego takes the same path against internal as it does against external danger. If the danger is from without, the organized being takes flight and then first of all withdraws from the perception of danger; later it is recognized that a more efficacious means is to effectuate such muscular actions that the perception of danger becomes impossible, even when it is not denied; in other words, to withdraw from the region of danger. One such effort at flight is equivalent to repression. The ego withdraws the (preconscious) investment from the instinct representation to be repressed and applies it for the disengagement of displeasure (anxiety). The problem of how anxiety arises from repression may be no simple one and in any case one has the right to hold fast to the idea that the ego is the chief place of anxiety and to reject the earlier notion that the investment energy of fixation of the repressed incitation becomes automatically changed to anxiety. If I formerly so expressed myself I was giving it a phenomenological and not a metapsychological presentation.

From what has been said a new question comes up. How is it economically possible that a mere withdrawal and conducting off---as in the retreat of a preconscious ego-investment---could engender disinclination or fear, which according to our presuppositions can result only from enhanced investment? My reply is that this causation is not to be explained economically. Anxiety is not newly engendered in repression but is reproduced as an affective state after a present memory picture. With a further inquiry as to the origin of this anxiety---as of affects in general---we abandon the undisputed psychological territory and enter the borderland of physiology. Affective states are incorporated into the soul life as precipitates of archaic traumatic experiences and are awakened in like situations as memory symbols. I mean that I am not in error in making them equivalent to the late and isolated hysterical attacks, and to be regarded as their normal prototypes. In mankind and the creatures related to him the act of parturition appears to be the first individual anxiety experienced to give the characteristic traits of the expression of an anxiety affect. We are not, however, to overestimate this connection and in its recognition are not to overlook the fact that an affect symbol is a biological necessity for a situation of peril and at all events must be obtained. I also hold that it is unjustified to assume that in every outbreak of anxiety something occurs in the soul life which reproduces the birth situation. It is not at all certain whether the hysterical attacks which are originally such traumatic reproductions maintain this character permanently.

Elsewhere I have deduced that most repressions with which we have to do therapeutically are cases of after-repression, which presuppose the existence of archaic repressions exerting their attractive influence on a newer situation. Of this background and forestage of repression too little is known. One comes easily into the danger of overestimating the rôle of the super-ego in repression.

At present we are unable to judge whether the appearance of the super-ego creates the border between primeval repression and late repression. The first---very intensive---outbursts of anxiety do at any rate follow upon the differentiation of the super-ego. It is plausible throughout that quantitative factors, such as the excessive strength of the excitation and the breach in the stimulus protection, are the first occasions of the primary repression.

Mention of protection from excitation reminds us like a catchword that repressions appear in two different situations---first, when an unpleasant instinctive stimulus is awakened by an external perception, and second, when the latter occurs from internal provocation. We will return later to this difference. Stimulus protection is afforded only against external irritation, not from internal instinctive demands.

As long as we study the attempt at flight of the ego we remain far from symptom formation. The symptom arises from the instinct stimulus which is encroached on by the repression. When the ego attains its objective, through the pain signal, of keeping under the instinct stimulus, we learn nothing as to how this is brought about. We only learn from cases which are to be termed more or less unsuccessful repressions.

In general, then, it is so presented that despite the repression the instinct stimulus has found a substitute, but this is strongly blighted, displaced and inhibited. It is no longer recognizable as a satisfaction. When it consummated, no feeling of pleasure accompanies it. For this reason the consummation has assumed the character of a compulsion. But in this lowering of the course of satisfaction to the symptom, the repression shows its power in another respect. The substitution process is withheld from removal by the motor actions and even when this is unsuccessful it must exhaust itself in the alteration of its own body and cannot encroach on the outer world; it is forbidden it to transform itself into activity. We understand that in suppression the ego works under the influence of external reality and on that account shuts off the result of the process of substitution from this reality.

The ego dominates the access to consciousness as also the transition to action against the external world; in repression its power is employed in both directions. The instinct object is adapted to sense one side, and the impulse prompting to the other side of its expression of force. It is now permissible to ask how this recognition of the power of the ego coincides with the description outlined of the position of the same ego in my study "The Ego and the It." We have therein depicted the dependence of the ego on the It and the super-ego and unmasked its weakness and readiness to anxiety toward both and its superiority, which has been built up laboriously. This judgment has since found a strong echo in psychoanalytic literature. Numerous voices emphasize urgently the weakness of the ego against the It, of the rational against the demoniacal in us, and are ready to make this proposition into a foundation for a psychoanalytic view of the universe. Should not the insight into the mode of action of repression be the very thing to hold the analyst back from so extreme a partisan designation?

I am not at all for the fabrication of world contemplations. One may leave such to philosophers who by their own confession cannot make life's journey practicable without such a Baedeker, which gives information about all things. Let us humbly take upon ourselves the contumely with which the philosophers look down upon us from the standpoint of their indigence. Since we, too, cannot deny our narcistic pride, we will seek our comfort in the venture that all of these life pilots soon age, that it is just our shortsighted restricted work in miniature which makes necessary their new editions, and that even the most modern of these Baedekers are essays to replace old catechism, so convenient and complete. We know exactly how little light science has hitherto diffused over the riddle of this world; all the noise of the philosophers can change nothing, only a patient continuation of the work which subordinates everything to one demand for certainty, can effect slowly the transformation. If the wanderer sings in the dark, he denies his anxiety but this does not make him see more clearly.

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III.

The Ego

To return to the problem of the ego: the appearance of contradiction is due to the fact that we take abstractions too rigidly and out of a complicated state of affairs look at first one, then another side alone. The separation of the ego from the It seems justified. It is forced on us by definite conditions. But on the other hand, the ego and It are identical, the ego is only a differentiated part of the same It. If in thought we place this fragment against the whole, or if there is a true dissension between the two, the weakness of this ego is manifest. But if the ego remains bound to the It and cannot be divided from it, its strength is manifest. The relation between the ego and super-ego is similar; in many situations the two flow together; mostly we can only distinguish between them when there is tension, a conflict, between them. For the case of repression this fact will be decisive, that the ego is an organization, the It is not. The ego is the organized part of the It. It would be quite unjustified if one should imagine that the ego and It are two unlike camps of warriors; in repression the ego seeks to repress a fragment of the It. but the remainder of the It comes to the rescue and measures its strength with that of the ego. This may often happen although it is certainly not the initial situation of repression; as a rule the instinct to be repressed is isolated. If the act of repression has shown us the strength of the ego, it bears witness of its weakness and for the fact that the individual instincts of the It cannot be influenced. For the process which has become a symptom through repression maintains its existence outside of the ego organization and independently of it. And not only this alone but all of its offshoots enjoy the same right, one may say the extraterritoriality. And where it comes together associatively with the portions of the ego organization, it may be asked whether these did not draw it to themselves and gain ground with this addition at the expense of the ego. A comparison long a favorite with us regards the symptom as a foreign body which ceaselessly maintains phenomena of irritation and reaction in the tissues in which it has embedded itself. It does indeed happen that the defensive battle against the unpleasant instinct is shut off through the symptom formation; as far as we can see this is possible in hysterical conversion, but usually the course is different---after the first act of repression there follows a tedious or never ending after-play; the fight against the instinct finds its continuation in the fight against the symptom.

This secondary defensive fight shows us two faces with contradictory expressions. On one hand the ego is notified through its nature to undertake something which we must estimate as an attempt at restoration or expiation. The ego is an organization, it rests upon free intercourse and the possibility of reciprocally influencing among all of its components. Its desexualized energy announces its origin in the effort towards union and unification and this urge to synthesis always increases with the strength which the ego develops. It therefore becomes intelligible that the ego also tries to abolish the strangeness and isolation of the symptom, using for this purpose all possibilities to bind it to itself and by such bands to incorporate it into its organization. We know that such an effort already influences the act to symptom formation. A classical example thereof is furnished by those hysterical symptoms which become transparent to us as a compromise between the requirement for gratification and the requirement for punishment. As fulfillment of a demand of the super-ego such symptoms have from the first a part in the ego while on the other hand they indicate positions of the repressed and breaches in the ego organization; they are, so to speak, border stations with mixed investments. Whether all primary hysterical symptoms are so constructed demands careful investigation. In further course the ego so behaves as if conducted by deliberation. The symptom is once there and cannot be removed. It must make friends with the situation and draw the greatest amount of benefit from it. An adaptation takes place with the ego-foreign fragment of the inner world which is represented through the symptom, as otherwise normally the ego brings to pass in the real outer world. There is never a lack of occasions. The existence of symptoms may bring with itself a certain inhibition of function with which one may soothe a demand of the super-ego or refuse a claim of the external world. The symptom is gradually entrusted with the representation of more important interests, it receives a value for self assertion, adheres more intimately to the ego and becomes more indispensable to it. Only in quite rare cases can the process be likened to the presence of a foreign body after a wound has healed. One may also exaggerate the importance of this secondary adaptation to the symptom in saying that the ego has created the symptom in order to derive benefit from it. This is just as true or false as when one presents the opinion that war-injured soldiers have allowed their legs to be shot off in order to live without work on their invalid pensions.

Other symptom formations, such as compulsion neurosis and paranoia, gain a high value for the ego, not because they are of advantage to it but because they bring a narcistic gratification which is indispensable. The system formations of the compulsive neurotic flatter his self love through the delusion that he is specially pure and conscientious and is better than other human beings. The delusional formations of paranoia open to the acumen and phantasy of these patients a field of activity which is not readily replaced. From all of these mentioned relations there results what is known as the (secondary) disease gain of the neurosis. There ensues the effort of the ego to incorporate the symptom into itself and strengthen the fixation of the latter. If we then make the attempt to furnish aid of analysis to the ego in its fight against the symptom, we find that these placable connections between the ego and symptom efficacious on the part of the resistance. It is not made easy for us to solve these. Both procedures which the ego applies against the symptom stand actually in opposition to each other.

The other procedure has a less friendly aspect and continues the direction of the repression. It seems, however, that we should not burden the ego with the reproach of futility. The ego is ready to be peaceable and would like to incorporate the symptom and take it into its ensemble. The disturbance proceeds from the symptom, which is the proper substitute and derivative of the repressed prompting. The latter rôle is played further, in that the urge for gratification is constantly renewed and so prompts the ego to again give the pain signal and come to its defense. The secondary defensive fight against the symptom is many sided and plays itself on different stages, serving itself with manifold means. We will state little if we do not take the individual cases of symptom formation as an object of investigation. By so doing we shall find occasion to go into the problem of anxiety which we have long spied lurking in the background. It would seem desirable to start out with the symptoms created by the hysterical neuroses, for we are not yet prepared for the presuppositions of symptom formation in the compulsive neuroses, paranoia, and other neuroses.

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IV.

Infantile Zoöphobia

Our first consideration will be that of infantile hysterical animal fear; for example, the typical case of horse fear of the five year old "Little Hans" (in Volume VIII of my collected papers published in German). Even the first glimpse allows us to recognize that the relations of a genuine case of neurotic disease are much more complicated than would be anticipated in our imagination as long as we work with abstractions. Some work must be devoted to orientation---which suppressed prompting, what symptom equivalent, what motive for suppression becomes recognizable.

The boy refused to go out in the street because of his fear of horses. This is the raw material. What is the symptom? Development of anxiety, selection of a feared object, renunciation of free mobility, or several such in combination? What gratification is given up? Why must he go without it? The case is not enigmatical. The incomprehensible fear of the horse is a symptom of incapacity for walking in the street, a phenomenon of inhibition, a limitation which is enjoined on the ego in order not to awaken the fear symptom. One sees straightway the correctness of the explanation of the last point and will leave this inhibition out of consideration in further discussion. But the first fugacious acquaintance with the case does not teach us to recognize the actual expression of the supposititious symptoms. As shown by further inquiry it had to do not with an indefinite fear of a horse, but a definite anxious expectation that the horse would bite him. It is true that this content sought to withdraw itself from consciousness and to replace it with an indefinite phobia in which only the fear and the object remain. Is this content the nucleus of the symptom?

We get no further so long as we do not draw the entire psychic situation of the child into consideration as is revealed with analytical work in general. In the Oedipus situation to the father we find jealousy and enmity although the boy loved him heartily aside from conditions in which the mother came into consideration. In other words there was an ambivalence conflict---well founded love with not less justified hate, both directed against the same person. His phobia must result from an effort to solve this conflict. Such ambivalence conflicts are very common and we know another typical ending. In this one of the two instincts which strive together, usually the tender one, greatly strengthened, causes the other to disappear. Only the excess and the compulsive character of the tenderness betray it, as this situation is not the only one present, and it is constantly on its guard to hold its opponent in subjugation and allows us to construe a procedure which we describe as repression through reaction formation in the ego. Cases like that of little Hans show nothing of such reaction formation; evidently there are different ways which lead out of an ambivalence conflict.

In the meantime we have learned something with certainty. The instinct stimulus which lies beneath the repression is a hostile impulse against the father. The analysis gives us the proofs, because it traces the origin of the idea of the biting horse. Hans had seen a horse fall, and had also seen a playmate fall and hurt himself when they were playing horse. This gave us the right to construe a wish impulse of Hans's which meant that the father might fall and injure himself. References to an observed departure allowed us to assume that the wish for the removal of the father had found a less timid expression. Such a wish, however, is equivalent to the intention to remove him himself, with the murderous stimulus of the Oedipus complex.

From this repressed instinct stimulus there leads up to now no way to a substitute for what we suppose to be hippophobia. Suppose we simplify the situation of the boy by clearing away the infantile factor and ambivalence. There is, perhaps, a young man servant who is enamored of the mistress and who rejoices in certain kindnesses on that account on her part. Suppose that he hates the stronger master of the house and would like to have him removed. The most natural consequence of this situation would be that he fears the revenge of the master, so that there develops a sense of fear---quite analogous to the phobia of the little boy for the horse. That is to say, we cannot designate the fear in this phobia as symptom; if the boy who loves his mother would show fear of his father we should have no right to impute to him a neurosis, a phobia. We have here a quite comprehensible affective reaction. That which would make a neurosis out of this is another trait and this only, the substitution of the horse for the father. This displacement produces something which has claim to the name of symptom. It is that other mechanism which permits the solution of the ambivalence conflict without the aid of a reaction formation. It is made possible or easier through the circumstance that the inborn traces of totemistic modes of thinking in this tender age are still readily animated. The cleft between human and animal is not yet recognized, certainly less emphasized than later. The adult, admired yet feared, still stands in a series with the larger animal, which man envies in many ways and of which he must be warned because the beast can be a source of danger. The ambivalence conflict is not decided on the same person but is as if circumvented, as one palms off one of his own promptings as that of a substitute man. Thus far we see clearly, but in another point analysis of the phobia of the boy has brought a complete disillusionment. The disguise in which the symptom formation exists is not at all undertaken as the representative (ideational content) of the instinct prompting to be repressed, but is quite different therefrom, which corresponds only to a reaction on the essentially unpleasant. Our anticipation would find a gratification sooner if the small Hans had developed in place of a phobia an inclination to mistreat the horse, to beat it, or had announced the wish to see it fall and hurt itself, perhaps to die in convulsions (making a riot with its legs). Something of the sort did develop during the analysis but it did not stand long prominent in the neurosis. Something there is not in order, either in our comprehension of the repression or in our definition of a symptom. One thing strikes us naturally at once: if little Hans had really shown this demeanor toward the horse, the character of the shocking, aggressive instinct stimulus would not be at all altered by the repression, only the object would be changed.

It is quite certain that there are cases of repression which do not perform more than this; but in the genesis of the phobia in little Hans more happened. As to how much more may be divined in another fragment of the analysis.

We have already heard that little Hans gave as the content of his phobia the idea of being bitten by the horse. Later we have had a glimpse into the genesis of another case[2] of animal phobia in which a wolf was the animal feared with likewise the significance of a father substitute. At the conclusion of a dream which made the analysis transparent there developed in this boy the fear of being devoured by a wolf like one of the seven kids in the fable. That the father of little Hans demonstrably had played horse with him had certainly been a determinant for the choice of the animal to be feared. Likewise, it was at least made probable that the father of my Russian (who was not analyzed until the third decade of his life) had also in play imitated a wolf and jokingly threatened to eat the boy. Since then I have found a third case in a young American in whom indeed no zoöphobia had developed but this very omission aids in clearing up the other cases. His sexual excitation had been kindled by a child's fanciful history which was read to him, about an Arabian chief who pursued a man consisting of an edible substance (the gingerbread man) in order to devour him. He identified himself with this edible man while the chieftain was readily recognizable as a substitute for the father and this fancy was the first substratum of his autoerotic activity. The idea of being devoured by his father is typical archaic child property; the analogies from mythology (Chronos) and from animal life are well known.

Despite these explanations the content of this idea is so strange to us that we could impute it to the child only with incredulity. We do not even know whether he really meant what he seemed to be saying and do no understand how he can be the subject of a phobia. Analytic experience, however, gives the requisite information and teaches us that the notion of being eaten by the father is the regressive degraded expression of a passive tender excitation which wishes to be loved by the father as an object in the sense of genital eroticism. The follow-up history of the case leaves no doubt as to the correctness of this interpretation. The genital striving does indeed betray nothing more of its tender intention if expressed in the speech of the vanquished transition phase of the oral to the sadistic libido organization. Does it have to do further with nothing more than a substitution of the representative through a regressive expression, or is there a genuine regressive degradation of the genitally directed striving in the It? It is not so easy to decide. The clinical history of the Russian wolf man speaks quite decidedly for the last named possibility for he himself behaved badly after the deciding dream---vexatiously and sadistically---and soon after developed a proper compulsion neurosis. In any case we gain the insight that the suppression is not the sole means which stands at the command of the ego for the rejection of an unpleasant impulse prompting. When he succeeds in bringing the impulse to regression he has injured it fundamentally with greater energy than was possible through its repression. Indeed, it often happens that the regression originally forced follows the repression.

The subject matter with the wolf man, and that somewhat simpler in the case of little Hans incite various other considerations but already we gain two unexpected glimpses. There is no doubt that in these phobias the repressed instinct is hostile to the father. One may say this was repressed through the process of transformation into the opposite; in place of aggression toward the father, the aggression---revenge---of the father is directed toward one's own person. As without this, such an aggression is rooted in the sadistic libido phase, it needs only to be degraded to the oral stage, indicated by Hans through the fear of being bitten, in the Russian carried out crudely by the fear of being devoured. Moreover the analysis established beyond all doubt that at the same time another instinct yielded to repression, the opposite of a tender passive excitation for the father, which had already reached the level of the genital (phallic) libido organization. The latter indeed seems more important for the end result of the process of repression; it experiences a further reaching regression and maintains the determining influence on the content of the phobia. Where we have investigated only a repression of impulse, we must recognize the coincidence of two such processes; both of the promptings---sadistic aggression against the father and a tender passive situation to him---form a contrasting pair. Still more: when we properly evaluate the history of little Hans we recognize that through the formation of his phobia the tender object-investment of the mother is also abolished, the content of phobia betraying nothing of this. In the case of Hans---it is much less distinct in the Russian---there is only a process of repression, which concerns almost all of the components of the Oedipus complex, the hostile as well as the tender incitation toward the father and the tender incitation toward the mother.

These complications are not wished for by us who desire to study only simple cases of symptom formation and with this intention we have applied ourselves only to the earliest and apparently most transparent neuroses of childhood. In place of a single repression we found a cumulation of such and in addition had to do with a regression. Perhaps we have increased the confusion when we treat our two disposable cases of zoöphobia alike---that of little Hans and the wolf man. Now certain differences occur to us. Only in the case of little Hans can we say with precision that through his phobia he disposed of both chief excitations of the Oedipus complex, the aggressive attitude against the father and the over tender one toward the mother; the tender feeling for the father is certainly obvious and plays its rôle in the repression of its opposite, but it is neither demonstrable that it was strong enough to provoke the repression nor that it was afterwards abolished. Hans seems to have been a normal child with a so-called positive Oedipus complex. It is possible that the elements which we missed were also coöperative but we could not point them out, the material even of our most thorough analyses is defective and our documentation imperfect. In the Russian the defect is in another place; its relation to the female object is disturbed by a precocious seduction; the passive, feminine side is strongly cultivated in him and the analysis of the wolf dream reveals little of intentional aggression against the father. Therefore the proofs are undoubted that the repression concerns the passive, tender situation to the father. Here also other factors may have actively participated, but such do not appear. If despite this distinction in the two cases, which almost approximates an antithesis, the end result of the phobia is almost the same, the explanation must come to us from another side; it comes from the second result of our little comparative study. We believe the motif for repression in both cases is known and we see its rôle corroborated through the course which was taken by the development of the two children. In both cases it is the same, the fear of threatened castration. Out of castration fear little Hans gave up his aggression toward the father; his fear that the horse would bite him can easily be completed---the horse would bite off his genitals, castrate him. But out of castration fear the little Russian renounced the wish to be loved by the father as a sexual object, for he had understood that such a relation had the presupposition that his genitals would be sacrificed---the organs which distinguished him from woman. Both forms of the Oedipus complex, the normal and active like the inverted, are shattered at the castration complex. The fear idea of the Russian, that of being devoured by the wolf, does not contain any hint of castration; it had through oral regression removed itself too far from the phallic phase, but the analysis of the dream makes every other proof superfluous. It is a complete triumph of suppression that in the text of the phobia there is no further hint of castration.

Here we have unexpected results. In both cases the motif of repression is the fear of castration; the content of the fear of being bitten by the horse and of being devoured by the wolf are substitutions, disguised, for the content of being castrated by the father. In the Russian it was the expression of a wish which could not exist if manhood were rebelled against; in Hans it was the expression of a reaction which aggression transformed to the opposite. But the fear affect of the phobia which makes up its nature, does not originate in the process of repression, nor from the libidinous fixations of the suppressed impulses but from that which is repressed. The fear in the zoöphobia is the untransformed castration fear, hence a true fear, fear of an actually threatened or actually judged danger. Here the fear makes the repression, not, as I once thought, the reverse.

It is not pleasant to think thus but it does not help to deny it. I have often represented the proposition that through repression the representative of the impulse is disguised, displaced, etc., the libido of the prompting being transformed into fear. Investigation of the phobias which before all should be called on to prove this proposition, not only did not confirm but seemed rather to contradict directly. The fear of the zoöphobias is the castration fear of the ego, that of the less fundamentally studied agoraphobia seems to be fear of temptation, which must cohere genetically with castration fear. Most phobias as far as we can see to-day go back to fear of the ego of the claims of the It. Here the fear situation of the ego is the primary one and the incentive to repression. The fear never comes forth from the libido. If I formerly pleased to say, after the repression appears a mass of fear in place of the expected expression of the libido, I have nothing to take back to-day. The description is correct and between the force of the prompting to be repressed and the intensity of the resulting fear the correspondence which I asserted doubtless exists. But I confess that I believe I gave more than a mere description, in assuming that I had recognized the metapsychological process of a direct transformation of the libido into fear. This I cannot to-day maintain. Nor was I formerly able to explain how this came to pass.

Whence did I draw the idea of this transformation? At a time when it was still not possible for us to distinguish between processes of the ego and processes of the It---from the study of actual neuroses---I found that definite sexual practices such as coitus interruptus, frustrated excitation, enforced abstinence, generated outbreaks of fear and a general predisposition to fears---always therefore when the course of sexual gratification was inhibited, delayed or diverted. As sexual excitement is the expression of libidinous promptings it does not seem venturesome to assume that libido is changed to fear through the influence of such disturbances. Now this observation holds good to-day. On the other hand it cannot be denied that the libido of the It processes experiences a disturbance through the incitement of the repression; it may be still better to say that fear arises in the repression from the libido investment of the instinct stimulus. But how may we harmonize this result with the other, that the fear of the phobias is an ego fear---originating in the ego, not produced by repression but producing the repression? This seems a contradiction and is not readily solved. The reduction of both origins of fear to one single fear is not readily carried through. One may try it with the assumption that the ego in the situation of the disturbed coitus, the interrupted excitement, the abstinence, scents danger, to which it reacts with fear. But nothing can be done with this. On the other hand the analysis of the phobias which we have undertaken seems not to admit of a justification. It is not clear.

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V.

Symptom Formation and the Secondary Defense of the Ego

We will study the symptom formation and the secondary combat of the ego against the symptom but we have frankly made no fortunate selection among the phobias. The fear which dominates in the picture of this affection appears to us now as a complication which veils the subject matter. There are neuroses in abundance in which no fear is shown. The genuine conversion hysteria is of this sort, and its severest symptoms are found with no admixture of fear. This fact must warn us that we must not adhere too closely to the relations between fear and symptom formation. Otherwise conversion hysteria stands so close to the phobias that I have held myself justified in grouping the latter with "fear hysterias." But no one has as yet been able to give the condition which differentiates between them or whether a case assumes the form of a conversion hysteria or a phobia. Nor has any one explored the reasons for development of fear in hysteria.

The commonest symptoms of conversion hysteria---a motor paralysis, contracture, involuntary action or discharge, a pain, a hallucination---are either permanently established or intermittent investment processes, the explanation of which prepares new difficulties. One really knows but little of such symptoms. Through analysis one may learn what disturbed course of excitement they replace. Mostly it results that they themselves have a part in these, as if the total energy had been concentrated on a fragment. Pain was present in the situation in which the repression fell; hallucination was at the time a perception; motor palsy was a defense against action which should have been carried out in that situation but was inhibited; contracture is usually a displacement for a muscular innervation intended at the time at another place; the convulsive attack an expression of an affective outbreak which has withdrawn itself from the normal control of the ego. Changeable in a striking manner is the feeling of disinclination which accompanies the appearance of the symptoms. In the permanent symptoms displaced as to motility, as palsies and contractures, this is mostly absent; the ego behaves against these as if non-participating. In the intermittent cases and in symptoms of the sensory sphere, these sensations of pain are as a rule distinct and in the case of pain the symptoms may increase to an excessive degree. It is very difficult in this manifoldness to find the factor which makes such differences possible and which can explain them in unit fashion. Even the battle of the ego against the once formed symptom is but little in evidence in conversion hysteria. Only when the sensitiveness to pain in some region of the body has become a symptom will this be placed in position to play a double rôle. The pain symptom appears just as certainly when this locality is touched from without, as when the pathogenic situation which represents it is associatively activated from within, and the ego grasps precautionary rules in order to hold back the awakening of symptoms through external perception. Whence originates the special opaqueness of symptom formation in conversion hysteria we cannot guess, but it gives us a motive to leave promptly a field so unfertile.

We turn now to compulsion neurosis in the expectation that here we can learn more about symptom formation. The symptoms of compulsion neurosis are in general of two kinds and of opposite tendencies. They are either prohibitions, precautions, expiations---hence negative in nature---or, contrariwise, they are substitute gratifications, very often in symbolic clothing. Of these two groups the negative, defensive, punitive, is the older and with the duration of the disease the gratifications which mock at all defense take the upper hand. It is a triumph of symptom formation when it succeeds in fusing the prohibition with gratification; so that the originally defensive command or prohibition obtains the significance of a gratification; whereby often very artificial methods of combination are claimed. In this performance an inclination to synthesis shows itself which we have already conceded to the ego. In extreme cases the patient effects that most of his symptoms have acquired the exact opposite of their original significance, a testimony of the power of ambivalence, which, we know not why, plays so great a rôle in compulsive neuroses. In the crudest cases the symptom is two stage---that is, upon the action which executes a certain instruction there follows immediately a second, which abolishes the first or makes it regressive if it does not dare to carry out the opposite.

Two impressions are at once derived from this fugacious survey of compulsive symptoms. The first, which is maintained in constant warfare against the repressed which applies itself more and more to the disfavor of the repressing forces, and the second, that the ego and super-ego play a specially large part in the symptom formation.

The compulsive neurosis is probably the most interesting and most gratifying object of analytical investigation although as yet it is an unconquered problem. If we will penetrate deeply into its nature we must confess that uncertain assumptions and unproved surmises cannot yet be dispensed with. The exit situation of the compulsive neurosis is probably no other than that of hysteria, the necessary defense against the libidinous claims of the Oedipus complex. In every compulsive neurosis we seem to find a lower stratum of precociously formed hysterical symptoms. Then, however, the further formation is decidedly altered by a constitutional factor. The genital organization of the libido shows itself as weakly and too little resistant. When the ego begins its defensive striving its first result is that the genital organization (phallic phase) regresses wholly or in part to an earlier sadistic-anal stage. This fact of regression remains a determinant of all that follows. One may draw yet another possibility into consideration. Perhaps the regression is not the consequence of a constitutional but a time factor. Hence it is not endowed with power because the genital organization of the libido is weak, but because the effort of the ego is premature, set in during the bloom of the sadistic phase. I do not trust myself to make a final decision upon this point, but analytical observation is not favorable to this supposition. Rather does it show that in the turn to compulsive neurosis the phallic stage has already been reached. The time of life for the outbreak of this neurosis is also later than for hysteria (the second childhood period after the termination of the latent period) and in a case of very late development of this affection which I could cite, it was clearly shown that a real depreciation of the hitherto intact genital life created the condition for the regression and the origin of the compulsive neurosis.[3]

The metapsychologic explanation of the regression is to be sought in a mixture of impulses, in the separation of an erotic component which appeared at the onset of the genital phase in the destructive investments of the sadistic phase.

The conquest of the regression signifies the first result of the ego in the defensive fight against the libido claims. We distinguish here the general tendency of the defense from the repression, which is only one of the defensive mechanisms. Perhaps still more clearly than in normal and hysterical cases one recognizes in the compulsive neurosis the castration complex as the motive of defense. We now find ourselves at the beginning of the latency period, which is characterized by the fall of the Oedipus complex, the creation or consolidation of the super-ego, and the erection of an ethical and esthetic shrine in the ego. These processes in compulsive neuroses go over the normal measure. For the destruction of the Oedipus complex the regressive degradation of the libido is added, the super-ego is especially rigid and unamiable, and the ego develops in obedience to the super-ego reaction pictures of conscience, sympathy and purity. With inexorable and not always successful rigidity, the temptation to the continuation of early infantile onanism is tabooed; it now leans upon regressive sadistic-anal ideas but represents the unconquered portion of the phallic organization. There is here an internal contradiction, so that in the very interest of preservation of manhood (castration fear) every activity of manhood is hindered but even this contradiction is only exaggerated in the compulsive neurosis and adheres already to the normal mode of removing the Oedipus complex. As every excess carries in itself the germ to a self-uplift, this holds good also in compulsion neuroses since the very repressed onanism forces itself in the form of compulsive actions to an ever-increasing approximation to gratification.