Transcriber’s notes:
Italic text is marked thus.
The spelling, hyphenation, punctuation and accentuation are as the original, except for apparent typographical errors which have been corrected.
Tiberius and Agrippina. From the painting by Peter Paul Rubens.
PLUTARCH’S ESSAYS AND MISCELLANIES
Comprising all his Works Collected
under the Title of “Morals” · Translated
from the Greek by Several Hands
Corrected and Revised by WILLIAM
W. GOODWIN, Ph.D., Professor of
Greek Literature in Harvard University
In Five Volumes · Volume Three
HONOS ET VIRTVS
BOSTON · LITTLE, BROWN
AND COMPANY · MCMXI
Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1870, By LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY, In the office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington.
Copyright, 1898, 1905,
By LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY.
Printers
S. J. PARKHILL & CO., BOSTON, U. S. A.
CONTENTS OF VOLUME THIRD.
WITH THE TRANSLATORS’ NAMES.
WHETHER 'TWERE RIGHTLY SAID, LIVE CONCEALED.
BY CHARLES WHITAKER, ESQUIRE, SOMETIME FELLOW OF NEW COLLEGE IN OXFORD.
He who said this had no mind to live concealed, 3. Such men strive hard to be known, 3. Even a bad man ought not to withdraw from the notice of others, 4. It is a loss to the world, if virtuous men live concealed, 5. If brave and good men become known, they are examples to others, 6. Virtue by use grows bright; but human abilities, unemployed, go to decay, 7. Our life and all our faculties were given to be used, and to make us known, 8. Only a vicious, useless life should be forgotten, 10.
AN ABSTRACT OF A COMPARISON BETWIXT ARISTOPHANES AND MENANDER
BY WILLIAM BAXTER, GENT.
Aristophanes suits low and vulgar persons; Menander the men of culture; the style of Aristophanes lacks fitness and propriety; it is harsh, coarse, and obscene; Menander charms us by his elegance and refinement, 11.
OF BANISHMENT, OR FLYING ONE’S COUNTRY.
BY JOHN PATRICK, OF THE CHARTERHOUSE.
Afflicted persons need to have their grief lightened, not increased, 15. Banishment may not be an evil of itself, but only as the mind makes it such, 16. If it be an evil, philosophy may help a man to bear it, 17. If it be an evil, let us consider how much good remains to balance it, 18. By nature, we have no country, we are citizens of the world, 18, 19. In whatever part of the world we are, we may make ourselves at home, 20. It is folly to suppose that we cannot enjoy life but where we were born, 20. A man of skill and ability can thrive anywhere, 21. Custom makes every thing and every place pleasant, 22. Change of scene may afford relief, 23. Happiness is not limited to place, 24. The Cyclades are places of exile, yet great men have lived there, 24. Homer commends islands as places of abode, 25. An island may be a place of much quiet and enjoyment, 25, 26. Few of the prudent and wise were buried in their own country, 27. Instances of the fact, 28. Some of the finest human compositions were written in exile, 29. Instances of this, 29. It is not ignominious to be banished, 29, 30. Instances produced, 30, 33. Banishment does not deprive us of our liberty, 31. We are all strangers and pilgrims on earth; the soul being of heavenly origin, 34.
OF BROTHERLY LOVE
BY JOHN THOMSON, PREBENDARY OF HEREFORD.
Address to two brothers, 36. Nature, by forming some of our most useful members in pairs, gives a hint of the need of harmony between brothers, 37. Nature admonishes us to prefer a brother to a stranger, 38. The author’s experience at Rome, 39. To our parents, next to the gods, is due the highest veneration, 40. Parents are happy in the union of brothers, and sad at their disagreement, 41. Love between brothers indicates love to parents, 42. Disaffection between brothers indicates great wrong somewhere, 43. Brothers, once alienated, can scarce become true friends again, 44. Brothers must bear with one another’s failings; they should not expect perfection, 45. If your brother has given offence to your father, intercede in his behalf, 47. If the father be dead, let justice preside in the division of his property, 48, 49. An unequal division produces lasting hatred and envy among brothers, 50, 51. If one brother excel another in talent or learning, let him treat the other with condescension and kindness, 52. And let not the other indulge envy, 53. Be not jealous of a brother’s prosperity, 53. Brothers should assist one another, 54. The elder brother should lead, but not be exacting and overbearing, 56. The younger should treat the elder with respect and deference, 56, 57. Avoid disagreements about little things, 57. Yield your wishes for peace’ sake, 58. Beautiful instance of fraternal concord from the history of Persia, 59. Another from the history of Syria, 60. When a brother has wronged a brother, let him confess it, 61. Kindness of Attalus to his brother Eumenes, 62. If brothers disagree, let each avoid a correspondence with the other’s enemies, 63. Cherish your brother’s friends, his wife and children, 64-68.
WHEREFORE THE PYTHIAN PRIESTESS NOW CEASES TO DELIVER HER ORACLES IN VERSE.
BY JOHN PHILIPS, GENT.
A walk in Delphi, 69. The statues there; the color of the brass admired, 70. The Corinthian brass, whence its extraordinary lustre and beauty, 70, 71. The atmosphere of Delphi, its effect on the brass of the statues, 72. The ancient oracles of Delphi, whence their rudeness and coarseness, 73. Could verses so devoid of neatness and elegance proceed from Apollo? 73. The ideas were supplied by Apollo: the words came from the priestess, 75. The statue of Hiero at Delphi: prodigy connected with it, 76. Other similar prodigies, 76. But these were mere accidents, 77. Strange and unlooked-for events may happen from natural causes, 78. Even though predicted, it was not from any foreknowledge of the prophet but only from plausible conjecture, 78. Conjectures are sometimes verified, 79. Yet there may be real predictions and actual prophetic inspiration, 80. Instances given, 80. Frogs and water-snakes: what relation have they to Apollo? 80-82; and why are they represented in the Corinthian Hall at Delphi? 80-82. Why does the Corinthian Hall bear that name? 82. The statue of Phryne the courtesan, 83. It was no worse to place such a statue in the temple of Apollo than to fill it with spoils taken in war, 84. Yet statues and offerings are sometimes placed there in token of gratitude, 85. But why does the Pythian priestess no longer deliver her oracles in verse? 86. In ancient times philosophers sometimes spoke in verse, while oracles were sometimes delivered in prose, 87, 88. Instances given, 88, 89. Some oracles are now uttered in verse, 90. A singular anecdote, 90. As the soul acts through the body as its servant and instrument, so the Deity uses the soul, 91. As the moon reflects the light of the sun, yet in diminished force, so the Pythia imperfectly yet really conveys the energy of the Deity, 92. The Deity uses men according to their ability, 93. The Pythian priestess, having had a slender education, cannot speak the language of culture and refinement, 93, 94. The times are much altered from what they once were. History and philosophy do not now take a poetical form, 95, 96. Poetry has lost its ancient credit, 98. This may account for the disuse of verse in the Delphic utterances, 98. The ambiguity of the ancient oracles accounted for, 99. In these times of public tranquillity there is no need of oracles, 100. Yet let us not blame the oracle, 103.
OF THOSE SENTIMENTS CONCERNING NATURE WITH WHICH PHILOSOPHERS WERE DELIGHTED.
BY JOHN DOWEL, VICAR OF MELTON MOWBRAY IN LEICESTERSHIRE.
BOOK I. A threefold division of Philosophy, 104. Natural Philosophy: what is Nature? 105. Difference between a principle and an element? 106. What are principles? 106. Opinions of Thales, Anaximander, Anaxagoras, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Epicurus, Empedocles, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, and others, concerning the origin of things, 107-113. How was the world brought into its present order and condition? 113. Whether the universe is one? 114. Whence the knowledge of a Deity? 115. Different orders and classes of Deities, 117. What is God? is he perfect? is he eternal? does he interfere with human affairs? Opinions of Pythagoras, of Socrates, Aristotle, Epicurus, 118-122. Of geniuses and heroes, 122. Of matter: different opinions, 123. Of ideas, 123. Of causes, 123. Of bodies, 124. Of least things in nature, 125. Of figures, 125. Of colors, 125. Of the division of bodies, 126. Of the mixture of the elements, 126. Of a vacuum, 126. Of place, 127. Of space, 127. Of time, 127. Of the essence and nature of time, 128. Of motion, 128. Of generation and corruption, 128. Of necessity, 129. Of the nature of necessity, 129. Of destiny or fate, 130. Of the nature of fate, 130. Of fortune, 131. Of nature, 131.
BOOK II. Of the world, κοσμόϛ, 132. Of the figure of the world, 133. Whether the world be an animal, 133. Whether the world be eternal and incorruptible, 133. Whence does the world receive nutriment? 134. From what element did God begin to raise the fabric of the world? 134. In what form and order was the world composed? 135. What is the cause of the world’s inclination? 136. Of that thing which is beyond the world, and whether it be a vacuum or not, 136. What parts of the world are on the right hand and what parts are on the left? 137. Of heaven, its nature and essence, 137. Into how many circles is the heaven distinguished? the division of heaven, 137. What are the stars made of? 138. Of what figure are the stars? 139. Of the order and place of the stars, 139. Of the motion and circulation of the stars, 140. Whence do the stars receive their light? 140. What are the stars called Dioscuri, or Castor and Pollux? 141. How stars prognosticate: what is the cause of winter and summer? 141. Of the essence of the sun, 141, 142. Of the magnitude of the sun, 142. Of the figure or shape of the sun, 143. Of the turning and returning of the sun, or the summer and winter solstice, 143. Of the eclipses of the sun, 144. Of the essence of the moon, 145. Of the moon’s magnitude and figure, 145. Whence does the moon receive her light? 145. Of eclipses of the moon, 146. Of the phases or aspects of the moon, 147. Of the distance of the moon from the sun, 147. Of the year and the length of the year in the different planets; of the great year, 147.
BOOK III. Of the galaxy, or milky way, 148. Of comets and shooting fires, 149. Of lightning, thunder, hurricanes, and whirlwinds, 150. Of clouds rain, snow, and hail, 151. Of the rainbow, 152. Of meteors which resemble rods, 153. Of winds, 154. Of winter and summer, 154. Of the earth, its nature and magnitude, 154. Of the figure of the earth, 155. Of the site and position of the earth, 155. Of the inclination of the earth, 155. Of the motion of the earth, 156. Of the zones of the earth, 156. Of earthquakes and their cause, 157. Of the sea, of what it is composed, and why it has a bitter taste, 158. Of the ebbing and flowing of the sea, 159. Of the halo, or circle round a star, 160.
BOOK IV. Of the overflowing of the Nile, 160. Of the soul, 161. Whether the soul be a body, and what is its nature and essence, 162. Of the parts of the soul, 162. What is the principal part of the soul, and in what part of the body does it reside? 163. Of the motion of the soul, 163. Of the soul’s immortality, 164. Of the senses, and their objects, 164. Whether what appears to our senses and imaginations be realities, 165. How many senses are there? 165. How the conceptions of the mind are received from the senses, 166. What is the difference between imagination (φαντασία), imaginable (φανταστόν), fancy (φανταστικόν), and phantom (φάντασμα)? 167. Of our sight, and by what means we see, 168. Of the images presented to the eye in mirrors, 169. Can darkness be visible to us? 169. Of hearing, 170. Of smelling, 170. Of taste, 170. Of the voice, 171. Whether the voice is incorporeal? what is it that gives the echo? 172. By what means the soul is sensible, 173. Of respiration or breathing, 173. Of the passions of the body, and whether the soul sympathizes? 175.
BOOK V. Of divination, 176. Whence do dreams arise? 176. Of the nature of generative seed, 177. Whether the sperm be a body, 177. Whether women give a spermatic emission, 177. How conception is effected, 178. After what manner males and females are generated, 178. Of the causes of monstrous conceptions, 179. How it comes to pass that a woman’s too frequent conversation with a man hinders conception, 179. Whence it is that one birth may give two or three children, 180. Whence arises the similitude of children to their parents? 180. How it sometimes happens that children resemble strangers and not their parents, 181. Whence arises barrenness in women, and impotency in men? 181. Why mules are barren, 182. Whether an unborn infant is an animal, 183. How the unborn child is nourished, 183. What part of the body is first formed in the womb? 184. Whence is it that infants born in the seventh month are born alive? 184. Of the generation of animals, 186. How many species of animals there are, and whether all animals have sense and reason, 187. What time is required to shape the parts of animals in the womb? 188. Of what elements is each of our members composed? 188. What causes sleep and death? 188. When is the perfection of a man dated? 189. Does the soul sleep or die with the body? 189. How plants grow, and whether they are animals, 190. Of nourishment and growth, 191. Whence is it that animals have appetites and pleasures? 191. What is the cause of a fever? 192 Of health, sickness, and old age? 192.
A BREVIATE OF A DISCOURSE SHOWING THAT THE STOICS SPEAK GREATER IMPROBABILITIES THAN THE POETS.
BY WILLIAM BAXTER, GENT.
Their philosophy leads to greater delusions than the fictions of the poets; it is more inconsistent with real life and with possible events, 194-196.
SYMPOSIACS.
BY T. C.
BOOK I. Question 1. At a feast is it allowable to talk learnedly and philosophize? 198. Long and tedious discourses would be out of place: but there must be conversation: let it be on useful subjects, 198-200. There are topics fit to be discussed at table, 200. Easy and pleasant discourse fits the occasion, 201. Disputation and pedantry are out of place, 202. 2. Whether the entertainer should seat the guests, or let every man take his own place, 203. The order and respect due to age, station, and relationship, may be observed without offence to any, the best man should have the best place, 204-206. Custom and decency should guide, 206-208. 3. Upon what account is the place at the table, called Consular, esteemed honorable? 210-212. Three reasons assigned, 211. 4. What qualifications should the steward of a feast possess? 212-216. He must be able to bear wine, have good nature, and suit his ministrations to the wants and tastes of all, 213-215. He must keep the company in good humor, and exclude every thing unpleasant, 216. 5. Why is it said that Love makes a man a poet? 217, 218. Poetry is the language of strong passion, 218. 6. Whether Alexander was a great drinker, 219-221. 7. Why old men love pure wine, 221. 8. Why old men read best at a distance, 222-224. 9. Why fresh water washes clothes better than salt, 224-226. 10. Why, at Athens, was it the privilege of the tribe Aeantis, that their chorus should never be determined to be the last? 226-228.
BOOK II. Question 1. What are the most agreeable questions and most pleasant raillery at an entertainment? 229-240. Questions are agreeable when they give a man opportunity to display his knowledge, to relate his own exploits, or to describe his own prosperity, 230-232. Raillery is pleasant when it refers to faults of which we are known to be innocent; when it implies gratitude for a favor bestowed; and when it proceeds from evident good humor, 233-240. 2. Why in autumn are men’s stomachs better than in other seasons of the year, 240, 241. 3. Which was first, the bird or the egg? 242-246. The perfect must come before the imperfect, 244. 4. Is wrestling the oldest exercise? 246, 247. 5. Why, in reckoning up different kinds of exercises, does Homer put them in this order,—Cuffing, Wrestling, Racing? 248, 249. 6. Why cannot Fir-trees, Pine-trees, and the like be grafted upon? 250, 251. 7. About the fish called Remora or Echeneis, 252. Why the horses called λυκοσπάδες are very mettlesome, 253. 9. Why the flesh of sheep bitten by wolves is sweeter than that of others, and the wool more apt to breed lice, 254. 10. Whether the ancients who provided for every one his mess did better than we who set many to the same dish, 255-258.
BOOK III. Wine reveals men’s secret thoughts, 259. Question 1. Whether it is becoming to wear chaplets of flowers at table, 260-265. Flowers were designed for our pleasure, 262. They have a good medicinal effect, 264. 2. Whether Ivy is of a hot or cold nature, 265-267. 3. Why women are hardly, old men easily, intoxicated, 268-270. 4. Whether the temper of women is colder or hotter than that of men, 270-272. 5. Whether wine is potentially cold, 272-274. 6. Which is the fittest time for a man to know his wife? 274-279. In the evening, not in the daytime, 276-278. 7. Why new wine does not intoxicate, 279, 280. 8. Why persons thoroughly drunk appear better than those only half-drunk, 281. 9. What means the saying, Drink either five or three, but not four? 282, 283. 10. Why flesh stinks sooner when exposed to the moon than to the sun, 284-287.
BOOK IV. A feast should be used for the cultivation of friendship, 288. Question 1. Whether different sorts of food or one single dish, fed upon at once, be more easily digested, 289-295. 2. Why mushrooms are thought to be produced by thunder, and why it is believed that men asleep are never thunderstruck, 295-300. 3. Why men usually invite many guests to a wedding supper, 300, 301. 4. Whether sea or land affords better food, 302-306. 5. Whether the Jews abstain from swine’s flesh because they worship that creature, or because they have an antipathy against it, 307-310. 6. What God is worshiped by the Jews? Bacchus, 310-312.
BOOK V. The soul has pleasures peculiar to itself and distinct from the body, 313. Question 1. Why do we take pleasure in a representation of human suffering, while we are shocked at the reality? 314-316. 2. That the prize for poets at the games was ancient, 316-318. 3. Why was the Pine counted sacred to Neptune and Bacchus, and why at first was the conqueror in the Isthmian Games crowned with a garland of Pine, afterwards with Parsley, and now again with Pine? 318-321. 4. Meaning of that expression in Homer, ζωρότερον δὲ κέραιε, “mix the wine stronger,” 321, 322. 5. Concerning those that invite many to a supper, 323-326 6. Why does a room which at the beginning of a supper seems too narrow for the guests appear wide enough afterwards? 326. 7. Concerning those that are said to bewitch, 327-332. 8. Why does Homer call the apple-tree ἀγλαόκαρπον, and Empedocles call the apples ὑπέρφλοια? 333, 334. 9. Why does the fig-tree, having itself a sharp and bitter taste, bear sweet fruit? 335. 10. What are those that are said to be περὶ ἄλα καὶ κύμινον, and why does Homer call salt divine? 336, 337.
BOOK VI. The memory of a useful discourse gives pleasure long afterwards, 338, 339. Question 1. Why are those that are fasting more inclined to drink than to eat? 339, 340. 2. Whether hunger and thirst are caused by want of nourishment or by a change in the pores or passages of the body, 341-344. 3. Why is hunger allayed by drinking, but thirst increased by eating? 345, 346. 4. Why is a bucket of water drawn out of a well, and left to stand all night in the air that is in the well, colder next morning than the rest of the water? 347, 348. 5. Why do pebble-stones and leaden bullets, thrown into the water, make it more cold? 348, 349. 6. What is the reason that snow is preserved by covering it with chaff and cloths? 350, 351. 7. Ought wine to be strained? 351-354. 8. What is the cause of Bulimy, or the greedy disease? 355-358. 9. Why does Homer appropriate to each particular liquid a special epithet, and use none when speaking of oil? 359, 360. 10. Why is the flesh of sacrificed animals, after being awhile upon a fig-tree, more tender than before? 361, 362.
BOOK VII. Question 1. Plato defended for saying that drink passeth through the lungs, 363-367. 2. What humored man is he whom Plato calls κερασβόλος, and why do seeds that fall on oxen’s horns become ἀτεράμονα? 368-370. 3. Why is the middle of wine, the top of oil, and the bottom of honey the best? 370, 371. 4. Why did the ancient Romans remove the table before all the meat was eaten, and why not extinguish the lamp? 372-375. To leave something for the servants, 374. “Leave something for the Medes”: a proverb in Boeotia, 375. 5. That we ought carefully to preserve ourselves from pleasures arising from bad music; and how it may be done, 376-380. Bad music, the loose ode, enervates and debauches the mind. Have recourse to that which is pure and good, ib. 6. Concerning those guests that are called shadows, whether being invited by some of the invited guests, but not by the entertainer, they ought to go to the house; and if so, in what cases? 381-387. Such a person is placed at a disadvantage on joining the company, and why, 382. But an invited guest, who has liberty to invite others may do so, yet with due caution and discretion; and the others may go, 385, 386. 7. Whether flute-girls may be admitted to a feast, 387, 388. 8. What sort of music is fittest for an entertainment? 389-394. Not tragedy, it is too grave and dignified, 390. But the New Comedy, as that of Menander, or a song with pipe or harp, 391, 392. 9. That the Greeks, as well as the Persians, were accustomed to debate state affairs at their entertainments, 394. 10. Was that a good custom? 395-398. Are men wise over their wine? 396. Men may drink freely, and yet not lose their wit, 397.
BOOK VIII. In our entertainments we may and should use learned and philosophical discourse, 399. Question 1. On the birthdays of famous men, and the generation of the Gods, 400, 401. 2. What is Plato’s meaning when he says that God all ways plays the geometer? 402-406. 3. Why sounds seem louder in the night than in the day, 406-410. 4. In the Sacred Games one sort of garland was given in one, and another in another: why was the Palm common to all? and why call the great dates Νικόλαοι? 411-414. 5. Why do those who sail upon the Nile take up the water they are to use before day? 415, 416 6. Concerning those who come late to an entertainment, and the derivation of the words ἀκράτισμα, ἀριστον, and δεὶπνον, 417-419. The Latin terms compared, 418. 7. Concerning the Symbols of Pythagoras: Receive not a swallow into your house; as soon as you are risen ruffle the bedclothes; and some other precepts: what is their meaning? 419-421. 8. Why the Pythagoreans do not eat fish, 422-426. 9. Whether there can be new diseases, and how caused, 426-432. On the negative, it is said the course of Nature is invariable, 427. The affirmative alleges that the causes of disease may vary, become intense and complicated, 430. Alterations in diet may raise new diseases, 432. 10. Why we give least credit to dreams in Autumn, 432-435.
BOOK IX. Question 1. Concerning verses fitly applied, and the reverse, 436-438. 2, 3. Why is Alpha placed first in the alphabet? and what is the proportion between the number of vowels and semi-vowels? 438-441. 4. Which of the hands of Venus did Diomedes wound? 441. 5. Why Plato says that the soul of Ajax came to draw her lot in the twentieth place in hell, 442, 443. 6. What is meant by the fable about the defeat of Neptune? and why do the Athenians omit the second day of the month Boëdromion? 444, 445. 12. Is it probable that the number of the stars is even or odd? 446. 13. A moot-point from the third book of the Iliad, 446-450. 14. Observations about the number of the Muses, and their relation to human affairs, 450-456. 15. That there are three parts in dancing, motion, gesture, and representation: what each part is, and what is common to both poetry and dancing, 457-460.
OF MORAL VIRTUE.
BY C. H., ESQUIRE.
Plan of the Essay, 461. Opinions of philosophers: of Menedemus, Ariston, Zeno, Chrysippus, 462. Opinion of Plato, 464; of Aristotle, 465. The soul has a twofold nature, 463. It is composed of intellect or reason, and the passions, 465. The reason and an intelligent judgment must govern, 466. The passions by long training becoming subject to the reason, the result is MORAL VIRTUE, 468. Science and Prudence, what, and their objects, 469. How science and prudence differ, 469, 470. Prudence has need of deliberation, 470. It corrects the excesses and defects of passion, 470. Moral virtue is the mean between excess and defect, 471. Yet it needs the ministry of the passions, 471. Mean and mediocrity not the same thing, 471. The idea further illustrated, 472. Continence distinguished from temperance, 473. Incontinence and intemperance, 474. Illustrations, 475, 476. Moral virtue is firm and immovable, 478. The passions are subject to frequent and sudden changes, 478. When reason is overborne by passion, there is a sense of guilt, 479. Reason is not at variance with itself, 480. The soul is at peace, where passion does not interpose, 480. Reason tends to what is true and just, 480. Reason, left to itself, embraces the truth, 481. It is often hindered by passion, 481. Reason and passion often divide the soul, 482. They often harmonize and concur, 483. Some philosophers affirm that reason and passion do not materially differ, 478. Their opinions controverted, 479, et seq. Their improper use of terms, 484. The passions differ with their occasions, 486. Men may mistake in their judgments, 487. The passions, deriving their strength from the body, are powerful in the young, 489. The state of the body corresponds with the state of the passions, 490. We should not seek to exterminate the passions, but to regulate and control them, 490. The passions have their proper use, 491. These considerations are of importance in the government of States, and in the education of the young, 493, 494.
NATURAL QUESTIONS
BY R. BROWN, M.L.
What is the reason that sea-water nourishes not trees? 495. 2. Why do trees and seeds thrive better with rain than with watering? 496. 3. Why do herdsmen place salt before cattle? 497. 4. Why is the water of thunder-showers fitter to water seeds? 498. 5. How comes it to pass that, since there are eight kinds of tastes, we find salt in no kind of fruit? 498, 499. 6. Why, if a man frequently pass along dewy trees, are those limbs that touch the wood seized with leprosy? 500. 7. Why in winter is the sailing of ships more slow in rivers than in the sea? 500. 8. Why, since all other liquors upon moving and stirring about grow cold, does the sea by being tossed in waves grow hot? 501. 9. Why in winter is the saltness of the sea diminished? 501. 10. Why do men pour sea-water into wine, and in defect thereof cast in some Zacynthian earth? 502. 11. What is the cause of sea-sickness? 502. 12. Why does pouring oil on the sea calm its waves? 503. 13. Why do fishermen’s nets decay more in winter than in summer? 503. 14. Why do the Dorians pray for bad making of their hay? 504. 15. Why is rich soil fruitful of wheat, and a thin soil of barley? 504. 16. Why is it said, Sow wheat in clay and barley in dust? 505. 17. Why is the hair of horses, rather than of mares, used for fishing-lines? 505. 18. Why is the sight of a cuttle-fish the sign of a great storm? 505. 19. Why does the polypus change color? 506. 20. Why are the tears of wild boars sweet, and the tears of the hart salt and hurtful? 507. 21. Why do tame sows farrow often, some at one time, and some at other times; and the wild but once a year, and all about the same time? 508. 22. Why are the paws of bears the sweetest and pleasantest food? 509. 23. Why are the tracks of wild beasts found with so much difficulty in spring? 509. 24. Why are their tracks worse scented about the full moon? 509. 25. Why does frost make hunting difficult? 510. 26. Why do brutes, when sick, seek appropriate remedies? 510. 27. Why does must, if the vessel stand in the cold, long continue sweet? 511. 28. Why, of all wild beasts, does not the boar bite the toil, though wolves and foxes do this? 512. 29. Why do we admire natural hot baths, and not cold? 512. 30. Why are vines which are rank of leaves, but otherwise fruitless, said τραγὰν? 513. 31. Why does the vine irrigated with wine, especially its own wine, perish? 513. 32. Why, of all trees, does the palm alone bend upward when a weight is laid on it? 514. 33. Why is pit-water less nutritive than that which comes from springs, or from the clouds? 514. 34. Why is the west wind commonly held to be the swiftest? 515. 35. Why cannot bees abide smoke? 515. 36. Why will bees sooner sting persons who have lately committed whoredom? 516. 37. Why do dogs follow after a stone thrown at them and bite it, letting alone the man who flung it? 516. 38. Why at a certain time of the year do all she-wolves bring forth whelps within the compass of twelve days? 517. 39. How comes it that water, apparently white at the top, is black at the bottom? 518.
INDEX
PLUTARCH’S MORALS.
PLUTARCH’S MORALS.
VOL. III.
WHETHER 'TWERE RIGHTLY SAID, LIVE CONCEALED.
1. It is sure, he that said it had no mind to live concealed, for he spoke it out of a design of being taken notice of for his very saying it, as if he saw deeper into things than every vulgar eye, and of purchasing to himself a reputation, how unjustly soever, by inveigling others into obscurity and retirement. But the poet says right:
I hate the man who makes pretence to wit,
Yet in his own concerns waives using it.[1]
For they tell us of one Philoxenus the son of Eryxis, and Gnatho the Sicilian, who were so over greedy after any dainties set before them, that they would blow their nose in the dish, whereby, turning the stomachs of the other guests, they themselves went away fuller crammed with the rarities. Thus fares it with all those whose appetite is always lusting and insatiate after glory. They bespatter the repute of others, as their rivals in honor, that they themselves may advance smoothly to it and without a rub. They do like watermen, who look astern while they row the boat ahead, still so managing the strokes of the oar that the vessel may make on to its port. So these men who recommend to us such kind of precepts row hard after glory, but with their face another way. To what purpose else need this have been said?—why committed to writing and handed down to posterity? Would he live incognito to his contemporaries, who is so eager to be known to succeeding ages?
2. But besides, doth not the thing itself sound ill, to bid you keep all your lifetime out of the world’s eye, as if you had rifled the sepulchres of the dead, or done such like detestable villany which you should hide for? What! is it grown a crime to live, unless you can keep all others from knowing you do so? For my part, I should pronounce that even an ill-liver ought not to withdraw himself from the converse of others. No; let him be known, let him be reclaimed, let him repent; so that, if you have any stock of virtue, let it not lie unemployed, or if you have been viciously bent, do not by flying the means continue unreclaimed and uncured. Point me out therefore and distinguish me the man to whom you adopt this admonition. If to one devoid of sense, goodness, or wit, it is like one that should caution a person under a fever or raving madness not to let it be known where he is, for fear the physicians should find him, but rather to skulk in some dark corner, where he and his diseases may escape discovery. So you who labor under that pernicious, that scarce curable disease, wickedness, are by parity of reason bid to conceal your vices, your envyings, your superstitions, like some disorderly or feverous pulse, for fear of falling into the hands of them who might prescribe well to you and set you to rights again. Whereas, alas! in the days of remote antiquity, men exhibited the sick to public view, when every charitable passenger who had labored himself under the like malady, or had experienced a remedy on them that did, communicated to the diseased all the receipts he knew; thus, say they, skill in physic was patched up by multiplied experiments, and grew to a mighty art. At the same rate ought all the infirmities of a dissolute life, all the irregular passions of the soul, to be laid open to the view of all, and undergo the touch of every skilful hand, that all who examine into the temper may be able to prescribe accordingly. For instance, doth anger transport you? The advice in that case is, Shun the occasions of it. Doth jealousy torment you? Take this or that course. Art thou love-sick? It hath been my own case and infirmity to be so too; but I saw the folly of it, I repented, I grew wiser. But for those that lie, denying, hiding, mincing, and palliating their vices, it makes them but take the deeper dye, it rivets their faults into them.
3. Again, if on the other hand this advice be calculated for the owners of worth and virtue, if they must be condemned to privacy and live unknown to the world, you do in effect bid Epaminondas lay down his arms, you bid Lycurgus rescind his laws, you bid Thrasybulus spare the tyrants, in a word, you bid Pythagoras forbear his instructions, and Socrates his reasonings and discourses; nay, you lay injunctions chiefly upon yourself, Epicurus, not to maintain that epistolary correspondence with your Asiatic friends, not to entertain your Egyptian visitants, not to be tutor to the youth of Lampsacus, not to present and send about your books to women as well as men, out of an ostentation of some wisdom in yourself more than vulgar, not to leave such particular directions about your funeral. And in fine, to what purpose, Epicurus, did you keep a public table? Why that concourse of friends, that resort of fair young men, at your doors? Why so many thousand lines so elaborately composed and writ upon Metrodorus, Aristobulus, and Chaeredemus, that death itself might not rob us of them; if virtue must be doomed to oblivion, art to idleness and inactivity, philosophy to silence, and all a man’s happiness must be forgotten?
4. But if indeed, in the state of life we are under, you will needs seclude us from all knowledge and acquaintance with the world (as men shut light from their entertainments and drinking-bouts, for which they set the night apart), let it be only such who make it the whole business of life to heap pleasure upon pleasure; let such live recluses all their days. Were I, in truth, to wanton away my days in the arms of your miss Hedeia, or spend them with Leontium, another dear of yours,—were I to bid defiance to virtue, or to place all that’s good in the gratification of the flesh or the ticklings of a sensual pleasure,—these accursed actions and rites would need darkness and an eternal night to veil them; and may they ever be doomed to oblivion and obscurity. But what should they hide their heads for, who with regard to the works of nature own and magnify a God, who celebrate his justice and providence, who in point of morality are due observers of the law, promoters of society and community among all men, and lovers of the public-weal, and who in the administration thereof prefer the common good before private advantage? Why should such men cloister up themselves, and live recluses from the world? For would you have them out of the way, for fear they should set a good example, and allure others to virtue out of emulation of the precedent? If Themistocles’s valor had been unknown at Athens, Greece had never given Xerxes that repulse. Had not Camillus shown himself in defence of the Romans, their city Rome had no longer stood. Sicily had not recovered her liberty, had Plato been a stranger to Dion. Truly (in my mind) to be known to the world under some eminent character not only carries a reputation with it, but makes the virtues in us become practical like light, which renders us not only visible but useful to others. Epaminondas, during the first forty years of his life, in which no notice was taken of him, was an useless citizen to Thebes; but afterwards, when he had once gained credit and the government amongst the Thebans, he both rescued them from present destruction, and freed even Greece herself from imminent slavery, exhibiting (like light, which is in its own nature glorious, and to others beneficial at the same time) a valor seasonably active and serviceable to his country, yet interwoven with his own laurels. For
Virtue, like finest brass, by use grows bright.[2]
And not our houses alone, when (as Sophocles has it) they stand long untenanted, run the faster to ruin; but men’s natural parts, lying unemployed for lack of acquaintance with the world, contract a kind of filth or rust and craziness thereby. For sottish ease, and a life wholly sedentary and given up to idleness, spoil and debilitate not only the body but the soul too. And as close waters shadowed over by bordering trees, and stagnated in default of springs to supply current and motion to them, become foul and corrupt; so, methinks, is it with the innate faculties of a dull unstirring soul,—whatever usefulness, whatever seeds of good she may have latent in her, yet when she puts not these powers into action, when once they stagnate, they lose their vigor and run to decay.
5. See you not how on night’s approach a sluggish drowsiness oft-times seizes the body, and sloth and inactiveness surprise the soul, and she finds herself heavy and quite unfit for action? Have you not then observed how a man’s reason (like fire scarce visible and just going out) retires into itself, and how by reason of its inactivity and dulness it is gently agitated by divers fantastical imaginations, so that nothing remains but some obscure indications that the man is alive.
But when the orient sun brings back the day,
It chases night and dreamy sleep away.
It doth, as it were, bring the world together again, and with his returned light call up and excite all mankind to thought and action; and, as Democritus tells us, men setting themselves every new-spring day to endeavors of mutual beneficence and service one towards another, as if they were fastened in the straitest tie together, do all of them, some from one, some from another quarter of the world, rouse up and awake to action.
6. For my own part, I am fully persuaded that life itself, and our being born at the rate we are, and the origin we share in common with all mankind, were vouchsafed us by God to the intent we should be known to one another. It is true, whilst man, in that little part of him, his soul, lies struggling and scattered in the vast womb of the universe, he is an obscure and unknown being; but, when once he gets hither into this world and puts a body on, he grows illustrious, and from an obscure becomes a conspicuous being; from an hidden, an apparent one. For knowledge does not lead to essence (or being), as some maintain; but the essence of things rather conducts us into the knowledge and understanding thereof. For the birth or generation of individuals gives not any being to them which they had not before, but brings that individual into view; as also the corruption or death of any creature is not its annihilation or reduction into mere nothing, but rather a sending the dissolved being into an invisible state. Hence is it that many persons (conformably to their ancient country laws), taking the Sun to be Apollo, gave him the names of Delius and Pythius (that is, conspicuous and known). But for him, be he either God or Daemon, who hath dominion over the opposite portion, the infernal regions, they call him Hades (that is, invisible)
Emperor of gloomy night and lazy sleep,
for that at our death and dissolution we pass into a state of invisibility and beyond the reach of mortal eyes. I am indeed of opinion, that the ancients called man Phos (that is, light), because from the affinity of their natures strong desires are bred in mankind of continually seeing and being seen to each other. Nay, some philosophers hold the soul itself to be essentially light; which they would prove by this among other arguments, that nothing is so insupportable to the mind of man as ignorance and obscurity. Whatever is destitute of light she avoids, and darkness, the harbor of fears and suspicions, is uneasy to her; whereas, on the other hand, light is so delicious, so desirable a thing, that without that, and wrapped in darkness, none of the delectables in nature are pleasing to her. This makes all our very pleasures, all our diversions and enjoyments, charming and grateful to us, like some universal relishing ingredients mixed with the others to make them palatable. But he that casts himself into obscure retirements, he that sits surrounded in darkness and buries himself alive, seems, in my mind, to repine at his own birth and grudge he ever had a being.
7. And yet it is certain, in the regions prepared for pious souls, they conserve not only an existence in (or agreeable to) nature, but are encircled with glory.
There the sun with glorious ray,
Chasing shady night away,
Makes an everlasting day;
Where souls in fields of purple roses play;
Others in verdant plains disport,
Crowned with trees of every sort,
Trees that never fruit do bear,
But always in the blossom are.[3]
The rivers there without rude murmurs gently glide, and there they meet and bear each other company, passing away their time in commemorating and running over things past and present.
A third state there is of them who have led vicious and wicked lives, which precipitates souls into a kind of hell and miserable abyss,
Where sluggish streams of sable night Spout floods of darkness infinite.[**duplicate anchor]
This is the receptacle of the tormented; here lie they hid under the veils of eternal ignorance and oblivion. For vultures do not everlastingly gorge themselves upon the liver of a wicked man, exposed by angry Gods upon the earth, as poets fondly feign of Prometheus. For either rottenness or the funeral pile hath consumed that long ago. Nor do the bodies of the tormented undergo (as Sisyphus is fabled to do) the toil and pressure of weighty burdens;
For strength no longer flesh and bone sustains.[4]
There are no reliques of the body in dead men which stripes and tortures can make impressions on; but in very truth the sole punishment of ill-livers is an inglorious obscurity, or a final abolition, which through oblivion hurls and plunges them into deplorable rivers, bottomless seas, and a dark abyss, involving all in uselessness and inactivity, absolute ignorance and obscurity, as their last and eternal doom.
AN ABSTRACT OF A COMPARISON BETWIXT ARISTOPHANES AND MENANDER.
1. To speak in sum and in general, he prefers Menander by far; and as to particulars, he adds what here ensues. Aristophanes, he saith, is importune, theatric, and sordid in his expression; but Menander not so at all. For the rude and vulgar person is taken with the things the former speaketh; but the well-bred man will be quite out of humor with them. I mean, his opposed terms, his words of one cadence, and his derivatives. For the one makes use of these with due observance and but seldom, and bestows care upon them; but the other frequently, unseasonably, and frigidly. “For he is much commended,” said he, “for ducking the chamberlains, they being indeed not chamberlains (ταμίαι) but bugbears (Λαμίαι).” And again,—“This rascal breathes out nothing but roguery and affidavitry;” and “Beat him well in his belly with the entrails and the guts;” and, “I shall laugh till I go to Laughington (Γέλαν);” and, “Thou poor sharded ostracized pot, what shall I do with thee?” and, “To you women surely he is a mad plague, for he grew up himself among these mad worts;”—and, “Look here, how the moths have eaten away my crest;” and, “Bring me hither the gorgon-backed circle of my shield;” “Give me the round-backed circle of a cheese-cake;”—and much more of such like stuff.[5] There is then in the structure of his words something tragic and something comic, something blustering and something prosaic, an obscurity, a vulgarness, a turgidness, and a strutting, with a nauseous prattling and fooling. And as his style has so great varieties and dissonances in it, so neither doth he give to his persons what is fitting and proper to each,—as state (for instance) to a prince, force to an orator, innocence to a woman, meanness of language to a poor man, and sauciness to a tradesman,—but he deals out to every person, as it were by lot, such words as come next to his hand, and you would scarce discern whether he that is talking be a son, a father, a peasant, a God, an old woman, or a hero.
2. But now Menander’s phrase is so well turned and contempered with itself, and so everywhere conspiring, that, while it traverses many passions and humors and is accommodated to all sorts of persons, it still shows the same, and even retains its semblance in trite, familiar, and every-day expressions. And if his master do now and then require something of rant and noise, he doth but (like a skilful flutist) set open all the holes of his pipe, and then presently stop them again with good decorum and restore the tune to its natural state. And though there be a great number of excellent artists of all professions, yet never did any shoemaker make the same sort of shoe, or tireman the same sort of visor, or tailor the same sort of garment, to fit a man, a woman, a child, an old man, and a slave. But Menander hath so addressed his style, as to proportion it to every sex, condition, and age; and this, though he took the business in hand when he was very young, and died in the vigor of his composition and action, when, as Aristotle tells us, authors receive most and greatest improvement in their styles. If a man shall then compare the middle and last with the first of Menander’s plays, he will by them easily conceive what others he would have added to them, had he had but longer life.
3. He adds further, that of dramatic exhibitors, some address themselves to the crowd and populace, and others again to a few; but it is a hard matter to say which of them all knew what was befitting in both the kinds. But Aristophanes is neither grateful to the vulgar, nor tolerable to the wise; but it fares with his poesy as it doth with a courtesan who, when she finds she is now stricken and past her prime, counterfeits a sober matron, and then the vulgar cannot endure her affectation, and the better sort abominate her lewdness and wicked nature. But Menander hath with his charms shown himself every way sufficient for satisfaction, being the sole lecture, argument, and dispute at theatres, schools, and at tables; hereby rendering his poesy the most universal ornament that was ever produced by Greece, and showing what and how extraordinary his ability in language was, while he passes every way with an irresistible persuasion, and wins every man’s ear and understanding who has knowledge of the Greek tongue. And for what other reason in truth should a man of parts and erudition be at the pains to frequent the theatre, but for the sake of Menander only? And when are the play-houses better filled with men of letters, than when his comic mask is exhibited? And at private entertainments among friends, for whom doth the table more justly make room or Bacchus give place than for Menander? To philosophers also and hard students (as painters are wont, when they have tired out their eyes at their work, to divert them to certain florid and green colors) Menander is a repose from their auditors and intense thinkings, and entertains their minds with gay shady meadows refreshed with cool and gentle breezes.
4. He adds, moreover, that though this city breeds at this time very many and excellent representers of comedy, Menander’s plays participate of a plenteous and divine salt, as if they were made of the very sea out of which Venus herself sprang. But that of Aristophanes is harsh and coarse and hath in it an angry and biting sharpness. And for my part I cannot tell where his so much boasted ability lies, whether in his style or persons. The parts he acts I am sure are quite over-acted and depraved. His knave (for instance) is not fine, but dirty; his peasant is not assured, but stupid; his droll is not jocose, but ridiculous; and his lover is not gay, but lewd. So that to me the man seems not to have written his poesy for any temperate person, but to have intended his smut and obscenity for the debauched and lewd, his invective and satire for the malicious and ill-humored.
OF BANISHMENT, OR FLYING ONE’S COUNTRY.
1. One may say of discourses what they use to say of friends, that they are the best and firmest that afford their useful presence and help in calamities. Many indeed present themselves and discourse with those that are fallen into misfortunes, who yet do them more harm than good. Like men that attempt to succor drowning persons and have themselves no skill in diving under water, they entangle one another, and sink together to the bottom. The discourses of friends, such as would help an afflicted person, ought to be directed to the consolation, and not to the patronage of his sorrows. For we have no need in our distresses of such as may bear us company in weeping and howling, like a chorus in a tragedy, but of such as will deal freely with us, and will convince us that,—as it is in all cases vain and foolish and to no purpose to grieve and cast down one’s self,—so, when the things themselves that afflict us, after a rational examination and discovery of what they are, give a man leave to say to himself thus.
Thou feel’st but little pain and smart.
Unless thou’lt feign and act a part,
it would be extremely ridiculous for him not to put the question to his body, and ask it what it has suffered, nor to his soul, and ask how much worse it is become by this accident, but only to make use of those teachers of grief from abroad, who come to bear a part with him in his sorrow, or to express indignation at what has happened.
2. Let us therefore, when we are alone, question with ourselves concerning the things that have befallen us, considering them as heavy loads. The body, we know, is under pressure by a burden lying upon it; but the soul oft-times adds a further weight of her own to things. A stone is hard and ice is cold by nature, not by any thing from without happening to make such qualities and impressions upon them. But as for banishment and disgraces and loss of honors (and so for their contraries, crowns, chief rule, and precedency of place), our opinion prescribing the measure of our joys or sorrows and not the nature of the things themselves, every man makes them to himself light or heavy, easy to be borne or grievous. You may hear Polynices’s answer to this question,
JOCAST. But say, is’t so deplorable a case To live in exile from one’s native place? POLYN. It’s sad indeed; and whatsoe’er you guess, ’Tis worse to endure than any can express.[6]
But you may hear Alcman in quite another strain, as the epigrammatist has brought him in saying:
Sardis, my ancient fatherland,
Hadst thou, by Fate’s supreme command,
My helpless childhood nourished,
I must have begg’d my daily bread,
Or else, a beardless priest become,
Have toss’d Cybele frantic down.
Now Alcman I am call’d—a name
Inscribed in Sparta’s lists of fame,
Whose many tripods record bear
Of solemn wreaths and tripods rare,
Achieved in worship at the shrine
Of Heliconian maids divine,
By whose great aid I’m mounted higher
Than Gyges or his wealthy sire.[7]
Thus one man’s opinion makes the same thing commodious, like current money, and another man’s unserviceable and hurtful.
3. But let us grant (as many say and sing) that it is a grievous thing to be banished. So there are also many things that we eat, of a bitter, sharp, and biting taste, which yet by a mixture of other things more mild and sweet have all their unpleasantness taken off. There are also some colors troublesome to look upon, which bear so hard and strike so piercingly upon the sight, that they confound and dazzle it; if now by mixing shadows with them, or by turning our eyes upon some green and pleasant color, we remedy this inconvenience, thou mayst also do the same to the afflictions that befall thee, considering them with a mixture of those advantages and benefits thou still enjoyest, as wealth, friends, vacancy from business, and a supply of all things necessary to human life. For I think there are few Sardians but would desire to be in your condition, though banished, and would choose to live as you may do, though in a strange country, rather than—like snails that grow to their shells—enjoy no other good, saving only what they have at home without trouble.
4. As he therefore in the comedy that advised his unfortunate friend to take heart and to revenge himself of Fortune, being asked which way, answered, By the help of philosophy; so we also may be revenged of her, by acting worthily like philosophers. For what course do we take when it is rainy weather, or a cold north wind blows? We creep to the fireside, or go into a bath, put on more clothes, or go into a dry house; and do not sit still in a shower and cry. It is in thy power above most men’s to revive and cherish that part of thy life which seems to be chill and benumbed, not needing any other helps, but only according to thy best judgment and prudence making use of the things that thou possessest. The cupping-glasses physicians use, by drawing the worst humors out of the body, alleviate and preserve the rest; but they that are prone to grieve and make sad complaints, by mustering together alway the worst of their afflictive circumstances, by debating these things over and over, being fastened (as it were) to their troubles, make the most advantageous things to be wholly useless to themselves, and especially when their case requires most help and assistance. As for those two hogsheads, my friend, which Homer says lie in heaven, full, the one of the good, the other of the ill fates of men,—it is not Jupiter that sits to draw out and transmit to some a moderate share of evils mixed with good, but to others only unqualified streams of evil; but it is we ourselves who do it. Those of us that are wise, drawing out of the good to temper with our evils, make our lives pleasant and potable; but the greater part (which are fools) are like sieves, which let the best pass through, but the worst and the very dregs of misfortune stick to them and remain behind.
5. Wherefore, if we fall into any real evil or calamity, we must bring in what is pleasant and delightful of the remaining good things in our possession, and thus, by what we enjoy at home, mitigate the sense of those evils that befall us from abroad. But where there is no evil in the nature of the things, but the whole of that which afflicts us is framed by imagination and false opinion, in this case we must do just as we deal with children that are apt to be frighted with false faces and vizards; by bringing them nearer, and making them handle and turn them on every side, they are brought at last to despise them; so we, by a nearer touching and fixing our consideration upon our feigned evils, may be able to detect and discover the weakness and vanity of what we fear and so tragically deplore.
Such is your present condition of being banished out of that which you account your country; for nature has given us no country, as it has given us no house or field, no smith’s or apothecary’s shop, as Ariston said; but every one of them is always made or rather called such a man’s by his dwelling in it or making use of it. For man (as Plato says) is not an earthly and unmovable, but a heavenly plant, the head raising the body erect as from a root, and directed upwards toward heaven.[8] Hence is that saying of Hercules:
Am I of Thebes or Argos? Whether
You please, for I’m content with either;
But to determine one, ’tis pity,
In Greece my country’s every city.
But Socrates expressed it better, when he said, he was not an Athenian or a Greek, but a citizen of the world (just as a man calls himself a citizen of Rhodes or Corinth), because he did not enclose himself within the limits of Sunium, Taenarum, or the Ceraunian mountains.
Behold how yonder azure sky,
Extending vastly wide and high
To infinitely distant spaces,
In her soft arms our earth embraces.[9]
These are the boundaries of our country, and no man is an exile or a stranger or foreigner in these, where there is the same fire, water, air, the same rulers, administrators, and presidents, the same sun, moon, and daystar; where there are the same laws to all, and where, under one orderly disposition and government, are the summer and winter solstices, the equinoxes, Pleiades, Arcturus, times of sowing and planting; where there is one king and supreme ruler, which is God, who comprehends the beginning, the middle, and end of the universe; who passes through all things in a straight course, compassing all things according to nature: justice follows him to take vengeance on those that transgress the divine law, which justice we naturally all make use of towards all men, as being citizens of the same community.
6. But for thee to complain that thou dost not dwell at Sardis is no objection; for all the Athenians do not inhabit Collytus, nor do all the men of Corinth live in the Cranium, nor all of Lacedaemon in Pitane.