PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
ABERDEEN UNIVERSITY PRESS.
PLATO,
AND THE
OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.
BY
GEORGE GROTE
A NEW EDITION.
IN FOUR VOLUMES.
VOL. I.
LONDON:
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.
1885.
The right of Translation is reserved.
ADVERTISEMENT.
In the present Edition, with a view to the distribution into four volumes, there is a slight transposition of the author's arrangement. His concluding chapters (XXXVIII., XXXIX.), entitled "Other Companions of Sokrates," and "Xenophon," are placed in the First Volume, as chapters III. and IV. By this means each volume is made up of nearly related subjects, so as to possess a certain amount of unity.
Volume First contains the following subjects:--Speculative Philosophy in Greece before Sokrates; Growth of Dialectic; Other Companions of Sokrates; Xenophon; Life of Plato; Platonic Canon; Platonic Compositions generally; Apology of Sokrates; Kriton; Euthyphron.
Volume Second comprises:--Alkibiades I. and II.; Hippias Major--Hippias Minor; Hipparchus--Minos; Theages; Erastæ or Anterastæ--Rivales; Ion; Laches; Charmides; Lysis; Euthydemus; Menon; Protagoras; Gorgias; Phædon.
Volume Third:--Phædrus--Symposion; Parmenides; Theætetus; Sophistes; Politikus; Kratylus; Philebus; Menexenus; Kleitophon.
Volume Fourth:--Republic; Timæus and Kritias; Leges and Epinomis; General Index.
The Volumes may be obtained separately.
PREFACE.
The present work is intended as a sequel and supplement to my History of Greece. It describes a portion of Hellenic philosophy: it dwells upon eminent individuals, enquiring, theorising, reasoning, confuting, &c., as contrasted with those collective political and social manifestations which form the matter of history, and which the modern writer gathers from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon.
Both Sokrates and Plato, indeed, are interesting characters in history as well as in philosophy. Under the former aspect, they were described by me in my former work as copiously as its general purpose would allow. But it is impossible to do justice to either of them--above all, to Plato, with his extreme variety and abundance--except in a book of which philosophy is the principal subject, and history only the accessory.
The names of Plato and Aristotle tower above all others in Grecian philosophy. Many compositions from both have been preserved, though only a small proportion of the total number left by Aristotle. Such preservation must be accounted highly fortunate, when we read in Diogenes Laertius and others, the long list of works on various topics of philosophy, now irrecoverably lost, and known by little except their titles. Respecting a few of them, indeed, we obtain some partial indications from fragmentary extracts and comments of later critics. But none of these once celebrated philosophers, except Plato and Aristotle, can be fairly appreciated upon evidence furnished by themselves. The Platonic dialogues, besides the extraordinary genius which they display as compositions, bear thus an increased price (like the Sibylline books) as the scanty remnants of a lost philosophical literature, once immense and diversified.
Under these two points of view, I trust that the copious analysis and commentary bestowed upon them in the present work will not be considered as unnecessarily lengthened. I maintain, full and undiminished, the catalogue of Plato's works as it was inherited from antiquity and recognised by all critics before the commencement of the present century. Yet since several subsequent critics have contested the canon, and set aside as spurious many of the dialogues contained in it,--I have devoted a chapter to this question, and to the vindication of the views on which I have proceeded.
The title of these volumes will sufficiently indicate that I intend to describe, as far as evidence permits, the condition of Hellenic philosophy at Athens during the half century immediately following the death of Sokrates in 399 B.C. My first two chapters do indeed furnish a brief sketch of Pre-Sokratic philosophy: but I profess to take my departure from Sokrates himself, and these chapters are inserted mainly in order that the theories by which he found himself surrounded may not be altogether unknown. Both here, and in the sixty-ninth chapter of my History, I have done my best to throw light on the impressive and eccentric personality of Sokrates: a character original and unique, to whose peculiar mode of working on other minds I scarcely know a parallel in history. He was the generator, indirectly and through others, of a new and abundant crop of compositions--the "Sokratic dialogues": composed by many different authors, among whom Plato stands out as unquestionable coryphæus, yet amidst other names well deserving respectful mention as seconds, companions, or opponents.
It is these Sokratic dialogues, and the various companions of Sokrates from whom they proceeded, that the present work is intended to exhibit. They form the dramatic manifestation of Hellenic philosophy--as contrasted with the formal and systematising, afterwards prominent in Aristotle.
But the dialogue is a process containing commonly a large intermixture, often a preponderance, of the negative vein: which was more abundant and powerful in Sokrates than in any one. In discussing the Platonic dialogues, I have brought this negative vein into the foreground. It reposes upon a view of the function and value of philosophy which is less dwelt upon than it ought to be, and for which I here briefly prepare the reader.
Philosophy is, or aims at becoming, reasoned truth: an aggregate of matters believed or disbelieved after conscious process of examination gone through by the mind, and capable of being explained to others: the beliefs being either primary, knowingly assumed as self-evident--or conclusions resting upon them, after comparison of all relevant reasons favourable and unfavourable. "Philosophia" (in the words of Cicero), "ex rationum collatione consistit." This is not the form in which beliefs or disbeliefs exist with ordinary minds: there has been no conscious examination--there is no capacity of explaining to others--there is no distinct setting out of primary truths assumed--nor have any pains been taken to look out for the relevant reasons on both sides, and weigh them impartially. Yet the beliefs nevertheless exist as established facts generated by traditional or other authority. They are sincere and often earnest, governing men's declarations and conduct. They represent a cause in which sentence has been pronounced, or a rule made absolute, without having previously heard the pleadings.[1]
[Footnote 1: Napoléon, qui de temps en temps, au milieu de sa fortune et de sa puissance, songeait à Robespierre et à sa triste fin--interrogeait un jour son archi-chancelier Cambacérès sur le neuf Thermidor. "C'est un procès jugé et non plaidé," répondait Cambacérès, avec la finesse d'un jurisconsulte courtisan.--(Hippolyte Carnot--Notice sur Barère, p. 109; Paris, 1842.)]
Now it is the purpose of the philosopher, first to bring this omission of the pleadings into conscious notice--next to discover, evolve, and bring under hearing the matters omitted, as far as they suggest themselves to his individual reason. He claims for himself, and he ought to claim for all others alike, the right of calling for proof where others believe without proof--of rejecting the received doctrines, if upon examination the proof given appears to his mind unsound or insufficient--and of enforcing instead of them any others which impress themselves upon his mind as true. But the truth which he tenders for acceptance must of necessity be reasoned truth; supported by proofs, defended by adequate replies against preconsidered objections from others. Only hereby does it properly belong to the history of philosophy: hardly even hereby has any such novelty a chance of being fairly weighed and appreciated.
When we thus advert to the vocation of philosophy, we see that (to use the phrase of an acute modern author[2]) it is by necessity polemical: the assertion of independent reason by individual reasoners, who dissent from the unreasoning belief which reigns authoritative in the social atmosphere around them, and who recognise no correction or refutation except from the counter-reason of others. We see besides, that these dissenters from the public will also be, probably, more or less dissenters from each other. The process of philosophy may be differently performed by two enquirers equally free and sincere, even of the same age and country: and it is sure to be differently performed, if they belong to ages and countries widely apart. It is essentially relative to the individual reasoning mind, and to the medium by which the reasoner is surrounded. Philosophy herself has every thing to gain by such dissent; for it is only thereby that the weak and defective points of each point of view are likely to be exposed. If unanimity is not attained, at least each of the dissentients will better understand what he rejects as well as what he adopts.
[Footnote 2: Professor Ferrier, in his instructive volume, 'The Institutes of Metaphysic,' has some valuable remarks on the scope and purpose of Philosophy. I transcribe some of them, in abridgment.
(Sections 1-8) "A system of philosophy is bound by two main requisitions: it ought to be true--and it ought to be reasoned. Philosophy, in its ideal perfection, is a body of reasoned truth. Of these obligations, the latter is the more stringent. It is more proper that philosophy should be reasoned, than that it should be true: because, while truth may perhaps be unattainable by man, to reason is certainly his province and within his power. . . . A system is of the highest value only when it embraces both these requisitions--that is, when it is both true, and reasoned. But a system which is reasoned without being true, is always of higher value than a system which is true without being reasoned. The latter kind of system is of no value: because philosophy is the attainment of truth by the way of reason. That is its definition. A system, therefore, which reaches the truth but not by the way of reason, is not philosophy at all, and has therefore no scientific worth. Again, an unreasoned philosophy, even though true, carries no guarantee of its truth. It may be true, but it cannot be certain. On the other hand, a system, which is reasoned without being true, has always some value. It creates reason by exercising it. It is employing the proper means to reach truth, though it may fail to reach it." (Sections 38-41)--"The student will find that the system here submitted to his attention is of a very polemical character. Why! Because philosophy exists only to correct the inadvertencies of man's ordinary thinking. She has no other mission to fulfil. If man naturally thinks aright, he need not be taught to think aright. If he is already in possession of the truth, he does not require to be put in possession of it. The occupation of philosophy is gone: her office is superfluous. Therefore philosophy assumes and must assume that man does not naturally think aright, but must be taught to do so: that truth does not come to him spontaneously, but must be brought to him by his own exertions. If man does not naturally think aright, he must think, we shall not say wrongly (for that implies malice prepense) but inadvertently: the native occupant of his mind must be, we shall not say falsehood (for that too implies malice prepense) but error. The original dowry then of universal man is inadvertency and error. This assumption is the ground and only justification of the existence of philosophy. The circumstance that philosophy exists only to put right the oversights of common thinking--renders her polemical not by choice, but by necessity. She is controversial as the very tenure and condition of her existence: for how can she correct the slips of common opinion, the oversights of natural thinking, except by controverting them?" Professor Ferrier deserves high commendation for the care taken in this volume to set out clearly Proposition and Counter-Proposition: the thesis which he impugns, as well as that which he sustains.]
The number of individual intellects, independent, inquisitive, and acute, is always rare everywhere; but was comparatively less rare in these ages of Greece. The first topic, on which such intellects broke loose from the common consciousness of the world around them, and struck out new points of view for themselves, was in reference to the Kosmos or the Universe. The received belief, of a multitude of unseen divine persons bringing about by volitions all the different phenomena of nature, became unsatisfactory to men like Thales, Anaximander, Parmenides, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras. Each of these volunteers, following his own independent inspirations, struck out a new hypothesis, and endeavoured to commend it to others with more or less of sustaining reason. There appears to have been little of negation or refutation in their procedure. None of them tried to disprove the received point of view, or to throw its supporters upon their defence. Each of them unfolded his own hypothesis, or his own version of affirmative reasoned truth, for the adoption of those with whom it might find favour.
The dialectic age had not yet arrived. When it did arrive, with Sokrates as its principal champion, the topics of philosophy were altered, and its process revolutionised. We have often heard repeated the Ciceronian dictum--that Sokrates brought philosophy down from the heavens to the earth: from the distant, abstruse, and complicated phenomena of the Kosmos--in respect to which he adhered to the vulgar point of view, and even disapproved any enquiries tending to rationalise it--to the familiar business of man, and the common generalities of ethics and politics. But what has been less observed about Sokrates, though not less true, is, that along with this change of topics he introduced a complete revolution in method. He placed the negative in the front of his procedure; giving to it a point, an emphasis, a substantive value, which no one had done before. His peculiar gift was that of cross-examination, or the application of his Elenchus to discriminate pretended from real knowledge. He found men full of confident beliefs on these ethical and political topics--affirming with words which they had never troubled themselves to define--and persuaded that they required no farther teaching: yet at the same time unable to give clear or consistent answers to his questions, and shown by this convincing test to be destitute of real knowledge. Declaring this false persuasion of knowledge, or confident unreasoned belief, to be universal, he undertook, as the mission of his life, to expose it: and he proclaimed that until the mind was disabused thereof and made painfully conscious of ignorance, no affirmative reasoned truth could be presented with any chance of success.
Such are the peculiar features of the Sokratic dialogue, exemplified in the compositions here reviewed. I do not mean that Sokrates always talked so; but that such was the marked peculiarity which distinguished his talking from that of others. It is philosophy, or reasoned truth, approached in the most polemical manner; operative at first only to discredit the natural, unreasoned intellectual growths of the ordinary mind, and to generate a painful consciousness of ignorance. I say this here, and I shall often say it again throughout these volumes. It is absolutely indispensable to the understanding of the Platonic dialogues; one half of which must appear unmeaning, unless construed with reference to this separate function and value of negative dialectic. Whether readers may themselves agree in such estimation of negative dialectic, is another question: but they must keep it in mind as the governing sentiment of Plato during much of his life, and of Sokrates throughout the whole of life: as being moreover one main cause of that antipathy which Sokrates inspired to many respectable orthodox contemporaries. I have thought it right to take constant account of this orthodox sentiment among the ordinary public, as the perpetual drag-chain, even when its force is not absolutely repressive, upon free speculation.
Proceeding upon this general view, I have interpreted the numerous negative dialogues in Plato as being really negative and nothing beyond. I have not presumed, still less tried to divine, an ulterior Affirmative beyond what the text reveals--neither arcana coelestia, like Proklus and Ficinus,[3] nor any other arcanum of terrestrial character. While giving such an analysis of each dialogue as my space permitted and as will enable the reader to comprehend its general scope and peculiarities--I have studied each as it stands written, and have rarely ascribed to Plato any purpose exceeding what he himself intimates. Where I find difficulties forcibly dwelt upon without any solution, I imagine, not that he had a good solution kept back in his closet, but that he had failed in finding one: that he thought it useful, as a portion of the total process necessary for finding and authenticating reasoned truth, both to work out these unsolved difficulties for himself, and to force them impressively upon the attention of others.[4]
[Footnote 3: F. A. Wolf, Vorrede, Plato, Sympos. p. vi.
"Ficinus suchte, wie er sich in der Zueignungsschrift seiner Vision ausdrückt, im Platon allenthalben arcana coelestia: und da er sie in seinem Kopfe mitbrachte, so konnte es ihm nicht sauer werden, etwas zu finden, was freilich jedem andern verborgen bleiben muss."]
[Footnote 4: A striking passage from Bentham illustrates very well both the Sokratic and the Platonic point of view. (Principles of Morals and Legislation, vol. ii. ch. xvi. p. 57, ed. 1823.)
"Gross ignorance descries no difficulties. Imperfect knowledge finds them out and struggles with them. It must be perfect knowledge that overcomes them."
Of the three different mental conditions here described, the first is that against which Sokrates made war, i.e. real ignorance, and false persuasion of knowledge, which therefore descries no difficulties.
The second, or imperfect knowledge struggling with difficulties, is represented by the Platonic negative dialogues.
The third--or perfect knowledge victorious over difficulties--will be found in the following pages marked by the character [Greek: to\ du/nasthai lo/gon dido/nai kai\ de/chesthai]. You do not possess "perfect knowledge," until you are able to answer, with unfaltering promptitude and consistency, all the questions of a Sokratic cross-examiner--and to administer effectively the like cross-examination yourself, for the purpose of testing others. [Greek: O(\lôs de\ sêmei=on tou= ei)do/tos to\ du/nasthai dida/skein e)/stin.] (Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 981, b. 8.)
Perfect knowledge, corresponding to this definition, will not be found manifested in Plato. Instead of it, we note in his latter years the lawgiver's assumed infallibility.]
Moreover, I deal with each dialogue as a separate composition. Each represents the intellectual scope and impulse of a peculiar moment, which may or may not be in harmony with the rest. Plato would have protested not less earnestly than Cicero,[5] against those who sought to foreclose debate, in the grave and arduous struggles for searching out reasoned truth--and to bind down the free inspirations of his intellect in one dialogue, by appealing to sentence already pronounced in another preceding. Of two inconsistent trains of reasoning, both cannot indeed be true--but both are often useful to be known and studied: and the philosopher, who professes to master the theory of his subject, ought not to be a stranger to either. All minds athirst for reasoned truth will be greatly aided in forming their opinions by the number of points which Plato suggests, though they find little which he himself settles for them finally.
[Footnote 5: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 11, 38.
The collocutor remarks that what Cicero says is inconsistent with what he (Cicero) had written in the fourth book De Finibus. To which Cicero replies:--
"Tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis mecum, et testificaris, quid dixerim aliquando aut scripserim. Cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus impositis disputant. Nos in diem vivimus: quodcunque nostros animos probabilitate percussit, id dicimus: itaque soli sumus liberi."]
There have been various critics, who, on perceiving inconsistencies in Plato, either force them into harmony by a subtle exegêsis, or discard one of them as spurious.[6] I have not followed either course. I recognise such inconsistencies, when found, as facts--and even as very interesting facts--in his philosophical character. To the marked contradiction in the spirit of the Leges, as compared with the earlier Platonic compositions, I have called special attention. Plato has been called by Plutarch a mixture of Sokrates with Lykurgus. The two elements are in reality opposite, predominant at different times: Plato begins his career with the confessed ignorance and philosophical negative of Sokrates: he closes it with the peremptory, dictatorial, affirmative of Lykurgus.
[Footnote 6: Since the publication of the first edition of this work, there have appeared valuable commentaries on the philosophy of the late Sir William Hamilton, by Mr. John Stuart Mill, and Mr. Stirling and others. They have exposed inconsistencies, both grave and numerous, in some parts of Sir William Hamilton's writings as compared with others. But no one has dreamt of drawing an inference from this fact, that one or other of the inconsistent trains of reasoning must be spurious, falsely ascribed to Sir William Hamilton.
Now in the case of Plato, this same fact of inconsistency is accepted by nearly all his commentators as a sound basis for the inference that both the inconsistent treatises cannot be genuine: though the dramatic character of Plato's writings makes inconsistencies much more easily supposable than in dogmatic treatises such as those of Hamilton.]
To Xenophon, who belongs only in part to my present work, and whose character presents an interesting contrast with Plato, I have devoted a separate chapter. To the other less celebrated Sokratic Companions also, I have endeavoured to do justice, as far as the scanty means of knowledge permit: to them, especially, because they have generally been misconceived and unduly depreciated.
The present volumes, however, contain only one half of the speculative activity of Hellas during the fourth century B.C. The second half, in which Aristotle is the hero, remains still wanting. If my health and energies continue, I hope one day to be able to supply this want: and thus to complete from my own point of view, the history, speculative as well as active, of the Hellenic race, down to the date which I prescribed to myself in the Preface of my History near twenty years ago.
The philosophy of the fourth century B.C. is peculiarly valuable and interesting, not merely from its intrinsic speculative worth--from the originality and grandeur of its two principal heroes--from its coincidence with the full display of dramatic, rhetorical, artistic genius--but also from a fourth reason not unimportant--because it is purely Hellenic; preceding the development of Alexandria, and the amalgamation of Oriental veins of thought with the inspirations of the Academy or the Lyceum. The Orontes[7] and the Jordan had not yet begun to flow westward, and to impart their own colour to the waters of Attica and Latium. Not merely the real world, but also the ideal world, present to the minds of Plato and Aristotle, were purely Hellenic. Even during the century immediately following, this had ceased to be fully true in respect to the philosophers of Athens: and it became less and less true with each succeeding century. New foreign centres of rhetoric and literature--Asiatic and Alexandrian Hellenism--were fostered into importance by regal encouragement. Plato and Aristotle are thus the special representatives of genuine Hellenic philosophy. The remarkable intellectual ascendancy acquired by them in their own day, and maintained over succeeding centuries, was one main reason why the Hellenic vein was enabled so long to maintain itself, though in impoverished condition, against adverse influences from the East, ever increasing in force. Plato and Aristotle outlasted all their Pagan successors--successors at once less purely Hellenic and less highly gifted. And when Saint Jerome, near 750 years after the decease of Plato, commemorated with triumph the victory of unlettered Christians over the accomplishments and genius of Paganism--he illustrated the magnitude of the victory, by singling out Plato and Aristotle as the representatives of vanquished philosophy.[8]
[Footnote 7: Juvenal iii. 62:--
"Jampridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes," &c.]
[Footnote 8: The passage is a remarkable one, as marking both the effect produced on a Latin scholar by Hebrew studies, and the neglect into which even the greatest writers of classical antiquity had then fallen (about 400 A.D.).
Hieronymus--Comment. in Epist. ad Galatas, iii. 5, p. 486-487, ed. Venet. 1769:--
"Sed omnem sermonis elegantiam, et Latini sermonis venustatem, stridor lectionis Hebraicæ sordidavit. Nostis enim et ipsæ" (i.e. Paula and Eustochium, to whom his letter is addressed) "quod plus quam quindecim anni sunt, ex quo in manus meas nunquam Tullius, nunquam Maro, nunquam Gentilium literarum quilibet Auctor ascendit: et si quid forte inde, dum loquimur, obrepit, quasi antiqua per nebulam somnii recordamur. Quod autem profecerim ex linguæ illius infatigabili studio, aliorum judicio derelinquo: ego quid in meâ amiserim, scio . . . Si quis eloquentiam quærit vel declamationibus delectatur, habet in utrâque linguâ Demosthenem et Tullium, Polemonem et Quintilianum. Ecclesia Christi non de Academiâ et Lyceo, sed de vili plebeculâ congregata est. . . . Quotusquisque nunc Aristotelem legit? Quanti Platonis vel libros novêre vel nomen? Vix in angulis otiosi eos senes recolunt. Rusticanos vero et piscatores nostros totus orbis loquitur, universus mundus sonat."]
CONTENTS.
PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY.
CHAPTER I.
Speculative Philosophy in Greece, before and in the time of Sokrates.
Change in the political condition of Greece during the life of Plato 1
Early Greek mind, satisfied with the belief in polytheistic personal agents, as the real producing causes of phenomena 2
Belief in such agency continued among the general public, even after the various sects of philosophy had arisen 3
Thales, the first Greek who propounded the hypothesis of physical agency in place of personal. Water, the primordial substance, or [Greek: a)rchê/] 4
Anaximander--laid down as [Greek: a)rchê/] the Infinite or Indeterminate--generation of the elements out of it, by evolution of latent, fundamental contraries--astronomical and geological doctrines ib.
Anaximenes--adopted Air as [Greek: a)rchê/]--rise of substances out of it, by condensation and rarefaction 7
Pythagoras--his life and career--Pythagorean brotherhood--great political influence which it acquired among the Greco-Italian cities--incurred great enmity, and was violently put down 8
The Pythagoreans continue as a recluse sect, without political power 9
Doctrine of the Pythagoreans--Number the Essence of Things ib.
The Monas--[Greek: a)rchê/], or principle of Number--geometrical conception of number--symbolical attributes of the first ten numbers, especially of the Dekad 11
Pythagorean Kosmos and Astronomy--geometrical and harmonic laws guiding the movements of the cosmical bodies 12
Music of the Spheres 14
Pythagorean list of fundamental Contraries--Ten opposing pairs ib.
Eleatic philosophy--Xenophanes 16
His censures upon the received Theogony and religious rites ib.
His doctrine of Pankosmism; or Pantheism--the whole Kosmos is Ens Unum or God--[Greek: E(\n kai\ Pan]. Non-Ens inadmissible 17
Scepticism of Xenophanes--complaint of philosophy as unsatisfactory 18
His conjectures on physics and astronomy ib.
Parmenides continues the doctrine of Xenophanes--Ens Parmenideum, self-existent, eternal, unchangeable, extended--Non-Ens, an unmeaning phrase 19
He recognises a region of opinion, phenomenal and relative, apart from Ens 20
Parmenidean ontology--stands completely apart from phenomenology 21
Parmenidean phenomenology--relative and variable 23
Parmenides recognises no truth, but more or less of probability, in phenomenal explanations.--His physical and astronomical conjectures 24
Herakleitus--his obscure style, impressive metaphors, confident and contemptuous dogmatism 26
Doctrine of Herakleitus--perpetual process of generation and destruction--everything flows, nothing stands--transition of the elements into each other backwards and forwards 27
Variety of metaphors employed by Herakleitus, signifying the same general doctrine 28
Nothing permanent except the law of process and implication of contraries--the transmutative force. Fixity of particulars is an illusion for the most part: so far as it exists, it is a sin against the order of Nature 29
Illustrations by which Herakleitus symbolized his perpetual force, destroying and generating 30
Water--Intermediate between Fire (Air) and Earth 31
Sun and Stars--not solid bodies, but meteoric aggregations dissipated and renewed--Eclipses--[Greek: e)kpu/rôsis], or destruction of the Kosmos by fire 32
His doctrines respecting the human soul and human knowledge. All wisdom resided in the Universal Reason--individual Reason is worthless 34
By Universal Reason, he did not mean the Reason of most men as it is, but as it ought to be 35
Herakleitus at the opposite pole from Parmenides 37
Empedokles--his doctrine of the four elements and two moving or restraining forces ib.
Construction of the Kosmos from these elements and forces--action and counteraction of love and enmity. The Kosmos alternately made and unmade 38
Empedoklean predestined cycle of things--complete empire of Love Sphærus--Empire of Enmity--disengagement or separation of the elements--astronomy and meteorology 39
Formation of the Earth, of Gods, men, animals, and plants 41
Physiology of Empedokles--Procreation--Respiration--movement of the blood 43
Doctrine of effluvia and pores--explanation of perceptions--intercommunication of the elements with the sentient subject--like acting upon like 44
Sense of vision 45
Senses of hearing, smell, taste 46
Empedokles declared that justice absolutely forbade the killing of anything that had life. His belief in the metempsychosis. Sufferings of life, are an expiation for wrong done during an antecedent life. Pretensions to magical power 46
Complaint of Empedokles on the impossibility of finding out truth 47
Theory of Anaxagoras denied--generation and destruction--recognised only mixture and severance of pre-existing kinds of matter 48
Homoeomeries--small particles of diverse kinds of matter, all mixed together ib.
First condition of things all--the primordial varieties of matter were huddled together in confusion. [Greek: Nou=s] or reason, distinct from all of them, supervened and acted upon this confused mass, setting the constituent particles in movement 49
Movement of rotation in the mass, originated by [Greek: Nou=s] on a small scale, but gradually extending itself. Like particles congregate together--distinguishable aggregates are formed 50
Nothing (except [Greek: Nou=s]) can be entirely pure or unmixed; but other things may be comparatively pure. Flesh, Bone, &c., are purer than Air or Earth 51
Theory of Anaxagoras, compared with that of Empedokles 52
Suggested partly by the phenomena of of animal nutrition 53
Chaos common to both Empedokles and Anaxagoras: moving agency, different in one from the other theory 54
[Greek: Nou=s], or mind, postulated by Anaxagoras--how understood by later writers--how intended by Anaxagoras himself ib.
Plato and Aristotle blame Anaxagoras for deserting his own theory 56
Astronomy and physics of Anaxagoras 57
His geology, meteorology, physiology 58
The doctrines of Anaxagoras were regarded as offensive and impious 59
Diogenes of Apollonia recognises one primordial element 60
Air was the primordial, universal element 61
Air possessed numerous and diverse properties; was eminently modifiable ib.
Physiology of Diogenes--his description of the veins in the human body 62
Kosmology and Meteorology 64
Leukippus and Demokritus--Atomic theory 65
Long life, varied travels, and numerous compositions, of Demokritus ib.
Relation between the theory of Demokritus and that of Parmenides 66
Demokritean theory--Atoms Plena and Vacua--Ens and Non-Ens 67
Primordial atoms differed only in magnitude, figure, position, and arrangement--they had no qualities, but their movements and combinations generated qualities 69
Combination of atoms--generating different qualities in the compound 70
All atoms essentially separate from each other 71
All properties of objects, except weight and hardness, were phenomenal and relative to the observer. Sensation could give no knowledge of the real and absolute ib.
Reason alone gave true and real knowledge, but very little of it was attainable 72
No separate force required to set the atoms in motion--they moved by an inherent force of their own. Like atoms naturally tend towards like. Rotatory motion, the capital fact of the Kosmos 72
Researches of Demokritus on zoology and animal generation 75
His account of mind--he identified it with heat or fire, diffused throughout animals, plants, and nature generally. Mental particles intermingled throughout all frame with corporeal particles ib.
Different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of the body 76
Explanation of different sensations and perceptions. Colours 77
Vision caused by the outflow of effluvia or images from objects. Hearing 78
Difference of tastes--how explained ib.
Thought or intelligence--was produced by influx of atoms from without 79
Sensation, obscure knowledge relative to the sentient: Thought, genuine knowledge--absolute, or object per se 80
Idola or images were thrown off from objects, which determined the tone of thoughts, feelings, dreams, divinations, &c. 81
Universality of Demokritus--his ethical views 82
CHAPTER II.
General Remarks on the Earlier Philosophers--Growth of Dialectic--Zeno and Gorgias.
Variety of sects and theories--multiplicity of individual authorities is the characteristic of Greek philosophy 84
These early theorists are not known from their own writings, which have been lost. Importance of the information of Aristotle about them 85
Abundance of speculative genius and invention--a memorable fact in the Hellenic mind 86
Difficulties which a Grecian philosopher had to overcome--prevalent view of Nature, established, impressive, and misleading ib.
Views of the Ionic philosophers--compared with the more recent abstractions of Plato and Aristotle 87
Parmenides and Pythagoras--more nearly akin to Plato and Aristotle 89
Advantage derived from this variety of constructive imagination among the Greeks 90
All these theories were found in circulation by Sokrates, Zeno, Plato, and the dialecticians. Importance of the scrutiny of negative Dialectic 91
The early theorists were studied, along with Plato and Aristotle, in the third and second centuries B.C. 92
Negative attribute common to all the early theorists--little or no dialectic 93
Zeno of Elea--Melissus ib.
Zeno's Dialectic--he refuted the opponents of Parmenides, by showing that their assumptions led to contradictions and absurdities 93
Consequences of their assumption of Entia Plura Discontinua. Reductiones ad absurdum 94
Each thing must exist in its own place--Grain of millet not sonorous 95
Zenonian arguments in regard to motion 97
General purpose and result of the Zenonian Dialectic. Nothing is knowable except the relative 98
Mistake of supposing Zeno's reductiones ad absurdum of an opponent's doctrine, to be contradictions of data generalized from experience 99
Zenonian Dialectic--Platonic Parmenides 100
Views of historians of philosophy, respecting Zeno 101
Absolute and relative--the first, unknowable ib.
Zeno did not deny motion, as a fact, phenomenal and relative 102
Gorgias the Leontine--did not admit the Absolute, even as conceived by Parmenides 103
His reasonings against the Absolute, either as Ens or Entia ib.
Ens, incogitable and unknowable 104
Ens, even if granted to be knowable, is still incommunicable to others ib.
Zeno and Gorgias--contrasted with the earlier Grecian philosophers 105
New character of Grecian philosophy--antithesis of affirmative and negative--proof and disproof ib.
CHAPTER III.
Other Companions of Sokrates.
Influence exercised by Sokrates over his companions 110
Names of those companions 111
Æschines--Oration of Lysias against him 112
Written Sokratic Dialogues--their general character 114
Relations between the companions of Sokrates--Their proceedings after the death of Sokrates 116
No Sokratic school--each of the companions took a line of his own 117
Eukleides of Megara--he blended Parmenides with Sokrates 118
Doctrine of Eukleides about Bonum 119
The doctrine compared to that of Plato--changes in Plato ib.
Last doctrine of Plato nearly the same as Eukleides 120
Megaric succession of philosophers. Eleian or Eretrian succession 121
Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus--Ethical, not transcendental 122
Preponderance of the negative vein in the Platonic age 123
Harsh manner in which historians of philosophy censure the negative vein ib.
Negative method in philosophy essential to the controul of the affirmative ib.
Sokrates--the most persevering and acute Eristic of his age 124
Platonic Parmenides--its extreme negative character 125
The Megarics shared the negative impulse with Sokrates and Plato 126
Eubulides--his logical problems or puzzles--difficulty of solving them--many solutions attempted 128
Real character of the Megaric sophisms, not calculated to deceive, but to guard against deception 129
If the process of theorising be admissible, it must include negative as well as affirmative 130
Logical position of the Megaric philosophers erroneously described by historians of philosophy. Necessity of a complete collection of difficulties 131
Sophisms propounded by Eubulides. 1. Mentiens. 2. The Veiled Man. 3. Sorites. 4. Cornutus 133
Causes of error constant--The Megarics were sentinels against them 135
Controversy of the Megarics with Aristotle about Power. Arguments of Aristotle ib.
These arguments not valid against the Megarici 136
His argument cited and criticised 137
Potential as distinguished from the Actual--What it is 139
Diodôrus Kronus--his doctrine about [Greek: to\ dunato/n] 140
Sophism of Diodôrus [Greek: O( Kurieu/ôn] 141
Question between Aristotle and Diodôrus, depends upon whether universal regularity of sequence be admitted or denied ib.
Conclusion of Diodôrus defended by Hobbes--Explanation given by Hobbes 143
Reasonings of Diodôrus--respecting Hypothetical Propositions--respecting Motion. His difficulties about the Now of time 145
Motion is always present, past, and future 146
Stilpon of Megara--His great celebrity 147
Menedêmus and the Eretriacs 148
Open speech and licence of censure assumed by Menedêmus 149
Antisthenes took up Ethics principally, but with negative Logic intermingled ib.
He copied the manner of life of Sokrates, in plainness and rigour 150
Doctrines of Antisthenes exclusively ethical and ascetic. He despised music, literature, and physics 151
Constant friendship of Antisthenes with Sokrates--Xenophontic Symposion 152
Diogenes, successor of Antisthenes--His Cynical perfection--striking effect which he produced ib.
Doctrines and smart sayings of Diogenes--Contempt of pleasure--training and labour required--indifference to literature and geometry 154
Admiration of Epiktêtus for Diogenes, especially for his consistency in acting out his own ethical creed 157
Admiration excited by the asceticism of the Cynics--Asceticism extreme in the East. Comparison of the Indian Gymnosophists with Diogenes ib.
The precepts and principles laid down by Sokrates were carried into fullest execution by the Cynics 160
Antithesis between Nature and Law or Convention insisted on by the Indian Gymnosophists 162
The Greek Cynics--an order of ascetic or mendicant friars 163
Logical views of Antisthenes and Diogenes--they opposed the Platonic Ideas ib.
First protest of Nominalism against Realism 164
Doctrine of Antisthenes about predication--He admits no other predication but identical 165
The same doctrine asserted by Stilpon, after the time of Aristotle 166
Nominalism of Stilpon. His reasons against accidental predication 167
Difficulty of understanding how the same predicate could belong to more than one subject 169
Analogous difficulties in the Platonic Parmenides ib.
Menedêmus disallowed all negative predications 170
Distinction ascribed to Antisthenes between simple and complex objects. Simple objects undefinable 171
Remarks of Plato on this doctrine 172
Remarks of Aristotle upon the same ib.
Later Grecian Cynics--Monimus--Krates--Hipparchia 173
Zeno of Kitium in Cyprus 174
Aristippus--life, character, and doctrine 175
Discourse of Sokrates with Aristippus ib.
Choice of Hêraklês 177
Illustration afforded of the views of Sokrates respecting Good and Evil ib.
Comparison of the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic Sokrates 178
Xenophontic Sokrates talking to Aristippus--Kalliklês in Platonic Gorgias 179
Language held by Aristippus--his scheme of life 181
Diversified conversations of Sokrates, according to the character of the hearer 182
Conversation between Sokrates and Aristippus about the Good and Beautiful 184
Remarks on the conversation--Theory of Good 185
Good is relative to human beings and wants in the view of Sokrates ib.
Aristippus adhered to the doctrine of Sokrates 186
Life and dicta of Aristippus--His type of character ib.
Aristippus acted conformably to the advice of Sokrates 187
Self mastery and independence--the great aspiration of Aristippus 188
Aristippus compared with Antisthenes and Diogenes--Points of agreement and disagreement between them 190
Attachment of Aristippus to ethics and philosophy--contempt for other studies 192
Aristippus taught as a Sophist. His reputation thus acquired procured for him the attentions of Dionysius and others 193
Ethical theory of Aristippus and the Kyrenaic philosophers 195
Prudence--good, by reason of the pleasure which it ensured, and of the pains which it was necessary to avoid. Just and honourable, by law or custom--not by nature 197
Their logical theory--nothing knowable except the phenomenal, our own sensations and feelings--no knowledge of the absolute 197
Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus passed to the Stoics and Epikureans 198
Ethical theory of Aristippus is identical with that of the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras 199
Difference in the manner of stating the theory by the two 200
Distinction to be made between a general theory--and the particular application of it made by the theorist to his own tastes and circumstances 201
Kyrenaic theorists after Aristippus 202
Theodôrus--Annikeris--Hegesias ib.
Hegesias--Low estimation of life--renunciation of pleasure--coincidence with the Cynics 203
Doctrine of Relativity affirmed by the Kyrenaics, as well as by Protagoras 204
CHAPTER IV.
Xenophon.
Xenophon--his character--essentially a man of action and not a theorist--the Sokratic element is in him an accessory 206
Date of Xenophon--probable year of his birth 207
His personal history--He consults Sokrates--takes the opinion of the Delphian oracle 208
His service and command with the Ten Thousand Greeks, afterwards under Agesilaus and the Spartans.--He is banished from Athens 209
His residence at Skillus near Olympia 210
Family of Xenophon--his son Gryllus killed at Mantineia ib.
Death of Xenophon at Corinth--Story of the Eleian Exegetæ 211
Xenophon different from Plato and the other Sokratic brethren 212
His various works--Memorabilia, Oekonomikus, &c. 213
Ischomachus, hero of the Oekonomikus--ideal of an active citizen, cultivator, husband, house-master, &c. 214
Text upon which Xenophon insists--capital difference between command over subordinates willing and subordinates unwilling 215
Probable circumstances generating these reflections in Xenophon's mind 215
This text affords subjects for the Hieron and Cyropædia--Name of Sokrates not suitable 216
Hieron--Persons of the dialogue--Simonides and Hieron ib.
Questions put to Hieron, view taken by Simonides. Answer of Hieron 217
Misery of governing unwilling subjects declared by Hieron 218
Advice to Hieron by Simonides--that he should govern well, and thus make himself beloved by his subjects 219
Probable experience had by Xenophon of the feelings at Olympia against Dionysius 220
Xenophon could not have chosen a Grecian despot to illustrate his theory of the happiness of governing willing subjects 222
Cyropædia--blending of Spartan and Persian customs--Xenophon's experience of Cyrus the Younger ib.
Portrait of Cyrus the Great--his education--Preface to the Cyropædia 223
Xenophon does not solve his own problem--The governing aptitude and popularity of Cyrus come from nature, not from education 225
Views of Xenophon about public and official training of all citizens 226
Details of (so called) Persian education--Severe discipline--Distribution of four ages 227
Evidence of the good effect of this discipline--Hard and dry condition of the body 228
Exemplary obedience of Cyrus to the public discipline--He had learnt justice well--His award about the two coats--Lesson inculcated upon him by the Justice-Master 229
Xenophon's conception of the Sokratic problems--He does not recognise the Sokratic order of solution of those problems 230
Definition given by Sokrates of Justice--Insufficient to satisfy the exigencies of the Sokratic Elenchus 231
Biography of Cyrus--constant military success earned by suitable qualities--Variety of characters and situations 232
Generous and amiable qualities of Cyrus. Abradates and Pantheia 233
Scheme of government devised by Cyrus when his conquests are completed--Oriental despotism, wisely arranged 234
Persian present reality--is described by Xenophon as thoroughly depraved, in striking contrast to the establishment of Cyrus 236
Xenophon has good experience of military and equestrian proceedings--No experience of finance and commerce 236
Discourse of Xenophon on Athenian finance and the condition of Athens. His admiration of active commerce and variety of pursuits ib.
Recognised poverty among the citizens. Plan for improvement 238
Advantage of a large number of Metics. How these may be encouraged ib.
Proposal to raise by voluntary contributions a large sum to be employed as capital by the city. Distribution of three oboli per head per day to all the citizens ib.
Purpose and principle of this distribution 240
Visionary anticipations of Xenophon, financial and commercial 241
Xenophon exhorts his countrymen to maintain peace 243
Difference of the latest compositions of Xenophon and Plato, from their point of view in the earlier 244
CHAPTER V.
Life of Plato.
Scanty information about Plato's life 246
His birth, parentage, and early education 247
Early relations of Plato with Sokrates 248
Plato's youth--service as a citizen and soldier 249
Period of political ambition 251
He becomes disgusted with politics 252
He retires from Athens after the death of Sokrates--his travels 253
His permanent establishment at Athens--386 B.C. ib.
He commences his teaching at the Academy 254
Plato as a teacher--pupils numerous and wealthy, from different cities 255
Visit of Plato to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse, 367 B.C. Second visit to the same--mortifying failure 258
Expedition of Dion against Dionysius--sympathies of Plato and the Academy 259
Success, misconduct, and death of Dion ib.
Death of Plato, aged 80, 347 B.C. 260
Scholars of Plato--Aristotle ib.
Little known about Plato's personal history 262
CHAPTER VI.
Platonic Canon, as Recognised by Thrasyllus.
Platonic Canon--Ancient and modern discussions 264
Canon established by Thrasyllus. Presumption in its favour 265
Fixed residence and school at Athens--founded by Plato and transmitted to successors ib.
Importance of this foundation. Preservation of Plato's manuscripts. School library 266
Security provided by the school for distinguishing what were Plato's genuine writings 267
Unfinished fragments and preparatory sketches, preserved and published after Plato's death 268
Peripatetic school at the Lykeum--its composition and arrangement 269
Peripatetic school library, its removal from Athens to Skêpsis--its ultimate restitution in a damaged state to Athens, then to Rome 270
Inconvenience to the Peripatetic school from the loss of its library ib.
Advantage to the Platonic school from having preserved its MSS. 272
Conditions favourable, for preserving the genuine works of Plato ib.
Historical facts as to their preservation ib.
Arrangement of them into Trilogies, by Aristophanes 273
Aristophanes, librarian at the Alexandrine library ib.
Plato's works in the Alexandrine library, before the time of Aristophanes 274
Kallimachus--predecessor of Aristophanes--his published Tables of authors whose works were in the library 275
Large and rapid accumulation of the Alexandrine Library ib.
Plato's works--in the library at the time of Kallimachus 276
First formation of the library--intended as a copy of the Platonic and Aristotelian [Greek: Mousei=a] at Athens 277
Favour of Ptolemy Soter towards the philosophers at Athens 279
Demetrius Phalereus--his history and character ib.
He was chief agent in the first establishment of the Alexandrine Library 280
Proceedings of Demetrius in beginning to collect the library 282
Certainty that the works of Plato and Aristotle were among the earliest acquisitions made by him for the library 283
Large expenses incurred by the Ptolemies for procuring good MSS. 285
Catalogue of Platonic works, prepared by Aristophanes, is trustworthy ib.
No canonical or exclusive order of the Platonic dialogues, when arranged by Aristophanes 286
Other libraries and literary centres, besides Alexandria, in which spurious Platonic works might get footing ib.
Other critics, besides Aristophanes, proposed different arrangements of the Platonic dialogues 287
Panætius, the Stoic--considered the Phædon to be spurious--earliest known example of a Platonic dialogue disallowed upon internal grounds 288
Classification of Platonic works by the rhetor Thrasyllus--dramatic--philosophical 289
Dramatic principle--Tetralogies ib.
Philosophical principle--Dialogues of Search--Dialogues of Exposition 291
Incongruity and repugnance of the two classifications 294
Dramatic principle of classification--was inherited by Thrasyllus from Aristophanes 295
Authority of the Alexandrine library--editions of Plato published, with the Alexandrine critical marks ib.
Thrasyllus followed the Alexandrine library and Aristophanes, as to genuine Platonic works 296
Ten spurious dialogues, rejected by all other critics as well as by Thrasyllus--evidence that these critics followed the common authority of the Alexandrine library 297
Thrasyllus did not follow an internal sentiment of his own in rejecting dialogues as spurious 298
Results as to the trustworthiness of the Thrasyllean Canon 299
CHAPTER VII.
Platonic Canon, as Appreciated and Modified by Modern Critics.
The Canon of Thrasyllus continued to be generally acknowledged, by the Neo-Platonists, as well as by Ficinus and the succeeding critics after the revival of learning 301
Serranus--his six Syzygies--left the aggregate Canon unchanged, Tennemann--importance assigned to the Phædrus 302
Schleiermacher--new theory about the purposes of Plato. One philosophical scheme, conceived by Plato from the beginning--essential order and interdependence of the dialogues, as contributing to the full execution of this scheme. Some dialogues not constituent items in the series, but lying alongside of it. Order of arrangement 303
Theory of Ast--he denies the reality of any preconceived scheme--considers the dialogues as distinct philosophical dramas 304
His order of arrangement. He admits only fourteen dialogues as genuine, rejecting all the rest 305
Socher agrees with Ast in denying preconceived scheme--his arrangement of the dialogues, differing from both Ast and Schleiermacher--he rejects as spurious Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Kritias, with many others 306
Schleiermacher and Ast both consider Phædrus and Protagoras as early compositions--Socher puts Protagoras into the second period, Phædrus into the third 307
K. F. Hermann--Stallbaum--both of them consider the Phædrus as a late dialogue--both of them deny preconceived order and system--their arrangements of the dialogues--they admit new and varying philosophical points of view ib.
They reject several dialogues 309
Steinhart--agrees in rejecting Schleiermacher's fundamental postulate--his arrangement of the dialogues--considers the Phædrus as late in order--rejects several ib.
Susemihl--coincides to a great degree with K. F. Hermann--his order of arrangement 310
Edward Munk--adopts a different principle of arrangement, founded upon the different period which each dialogue exhibits of the life, philosophical growth, and old age, of Sokrates--his arrangement, founded on this principle. He distinguishes the chronological order of composition from the place allotted to each dialogue in the systematic plan 311
Views of Ueberweg--attempt to reconcile Schleiermacher and Hermann--admits the preconceived purpose for the later dialogues, composed after the foundation of the school, but not for the earlier 313
His opinions as to authenticity and chronology of the dialogues, He rejects Hippias Major, Erastæ, Theagês, Kleitophon, Parmenidês: he is inclined to reject Euthyphron and Menexenus 314
Other Platonic critics--great dissensions about scheme and order of the dialogues 316
Contrast of different points of view instructive--but no solution has been obtained ib.
The problem incapable of solution. Extent and novelty of the theory propounded by Schleiermacher--slenderness of his proofs 317
Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes a preconceived scheme, and a peremptory order of interdependence among the dialogues 318
Assumptions of Schleiermacher respecting the Phædrus inadmissible 319
Neither Schleiermacher, nor any other critic, has as yet produced any tolerable proof for an internal theory of the Platonic dialogues ib.
Munk's theory is the most ambitious, and the most gratuitous, next to Schleiermacher's 320
The age assigned to Sokrates in any dialogue is a circumstance of little moment ib.
No intentional sequence or interdependence of the dialogues can be made out 322
Principle of arrangement adopted by Hermann is reasonable--successive changes in Plato's point of view: but we cannot explain either the order or the causes of these changes ib.
Hermann's view more tenable than Schleiermacher's 323
Small number of certainties, or even reasonable presumptions, as to date or order of the dialogues 324
Trilogies indicated by Plato himself 325
Positive dates of all the dialogues--unknown 326
When did Plato begin to compose? Not till after the death of Sokrates ib.
Reasons for this opinion. Labour of the composition--does not consist with youth of the author 327
Reasons founded on the personality of Sokrates, and his relations with Plato 328
Reasons, founded on the early life, character, and position of Plato 330
Plato's early life--active by necessity, and to some extent ambitious 331
Plato did not retire from political life until after the restoration of the democracy, nor devote himself to philosophy until after the death of Sokrates 333
All Plato's dialogues were composed during the fifty-one years after the death of Sokrates 334
The Thrasyllean Canon is more worthy of trust than the modern critical theories by which it has been condemned 335
Unsafe grounds upon which those theories proceed 336
Opinions of Schleiermacher, tending to show this 337
Any true theory of Plato must recognise all his varieties, and must be based upon all the works in the Canon, not upon some to the exclusion of the rest 339
CHAPTER VIII.
Platonic Compositions Generally.
Variety and abundance visible in Plato's writings 342
Plato both sceptical and dogmatical ib.
Poetical vein predominant in some compositions, but not in all 343
Form of dialogue--universal to this extent, that Plato never speaks in his own name 344
No one common characteristic pervading all Plato's works ib.
The real Plato was not merely a writer of dialogues, but also lecturer and president of a school. In this last important function he is scarcely at all known to us. Notes of his lectures taken by Aristotle 346
Plato's lectures De Bono obscure and transcendental. Effect which they produced on the auditors 347
They were delivered to miscellaneous auditors. They coincide mainly with what Aristotle states about the Platonic Ideas 348
The lectures De Bono may perhaps have been more transcendental than Plato's other lectures 349
Plato's Epistles--in them only he speaks in his own person ib.
Intentional obscurity of his Epistles in reference to philosophical doctrine 350
Letters of Plato to Dionysius II. about philosophy. His anxiety to confine philosophy to discussion among select and prepared minds 351
He refuses to furnish any written, authoritative exposition of his own philosophical doctrine 352
He illustrates his doctrine by the successive stages of geometrical teaching. Difficulty to avoid the creeping in of error at each of these stages 353
No written exposition can keep clear of these chances of error 355
Relations of Plato with Dionysius II. and the friends of the deceased Dion. Pretensions of Dionysius to understand and expound Plato's doctrines ib.
Impossibility of teaching by written exposition assumed by Plato; the assumption intelligible in his day 357
Standard by which Plato tested the efficacy of the expository process.--Power of sustaining a Sokratic cross-examination 358
Plato never published any of the lectures which he delivered at the Academy ib.
Plato would never publish his philosophical opinions in his own name; but he may have published them in the dialogues under the name of others 360
Groups into which the dialogues admit of being thrown 361