Financial Crisis Inquiry Report

1. 1 PrefaceRead by Joanne Turner 8m
2. 2 Conclusions of the CommissionRead by Joanne Turner 38m
3. 3 Conclusions of the Commission, concludedRead by Joanne Turner 22m
4. 4 Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 1Read by Joanne Turner 38m
5. 5 Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 2Read by Joanne Turner 45m
6. 6 Ch. 1. Before Our Very Eyes, part 3Read by Joanne Turner 17m
7. 7 Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: Commercial Paper and ReposRead by Joanne Turner 30m
8. 8 Ch. 2. Shadow Banking: The Savings and Loan CrisisRead by Joanne Turner 18m
9. 9 Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Fannie Mae and Freddie MacRead by Joanne Turner 20m
10. 10 Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: Structured FinanceRead by Joanne Turner 12m
11. 11 Ch. 3. Securitization and Derivatives: The Growth of DerivativesRead by Joanne Turner 25m
12. 12 Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Expansion of Banking ActivitiesRead by Joanne Turner 19m
13. 13 Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Long-Term Capital ManagementRead by Joanne Turner 12m
14. 14 Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Dot-Com CrashRead by Joanne Turner 12m
15. 15 Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: The Wages of FinanceRead by Joanne Turner 13m
16. 16 Ch. 4. Deregulation Redux: Financial Sector GrowthRead by Joanne Turner 8m
17. 17 Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Mortgage SecuritizationRead by Joanne Turner 17m
18. 18 Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Greater Access to LendingRead by Joanne Turner 6m
19. 19 Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: Subprime Lenders in TurmoilRead by Joanne Turner 5m
20. 20 Ch. 5. Subprime Lending: The RegulatorsRead by Joanne Turner 19m
21. 21 Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Housing, A Powerful Stabilizing ForceRead by Joanne Turner 19m
22. 22 Ch. 6. Credit Expansion: Subprime Loans, Buyers Will Pay A PremiumRead by Joanne Turner 18m
23. 23 Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Citigroup: Invited Regulatory ScrutinyRead by Joanne Turner 4m
24. 24 Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Federal Rules: Intended to Curb Unfair or Abusive LendingRead by Joanne Turner 12m
25. 25 Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. States: Long-Standing PositionRead by Joanne Turner 4m
26. 26 Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Community-Lending Pledges: What We Do Is Reaffirm Our Intention"Read by Joanne Turner 10m
27. 27 Ch. 6. Credit Expansion. Bank Capital Standards: "Arbitrage"Read by Joanne Turner 5m
28. 28 Ch. 6. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 6Read by Joanne Turner 1m
29. 29 Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. An Irresistible Profit OpportunityRead by Joanne Turner 10m
30. 30 Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Mortgages: A Good LoanRead by Joanne Turner 32m
31. 31 Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Federal Regulators: Immunity from Many State Laws is a Significant BenefitRead by Joanne Turner 6m
32. 32 Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Wall Street Was Very Hungry For Our ProductRead by Joanne Turner 17m
33. 33 Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Moody's: Given A Blank CheckRead by Joanne Turner 16m
34. 34 Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Less Competition in the MarketplaceRead by Joanne Turner 13m
35. 35 Ch. 7. The Mortgage Machine. Commission Conclusions on Chapter 7Read by Joanne Turner 3m
36. 36 Ch. 8. The CDO MachineRead by Joanne Turner 7m
37. 37 Ch. 8. We Created the InvestorRead by Joanne Turner 22m
38. 38 Ch. 8. Bear Stearns' Hedge Funds: It Functioned Fine Up Until One Day It Just Didn't FunctionRead by Joanne Turner 10m
39. 39 Ch. 8. Citigroup's Liquidity puts: A Potential Conflict of InterestRead by Joanne Turner 10m
40. 40 Ch. 8. AIG:Golden Goose for the Entire StreetRead by Joanne Turner 10m
41. 41 Ch. 8. Goldman Sachs: Multiplied the Effects of the Collapse in SubprimeRead by Joanne Turner 17m
42. 42 Ch. 8. Moody's: Achieved Through Some AlchemyRead by Joanne Turner 18m
43. 43 Ch. 8. SEC: It's Going to be an Awfully Big MessRead by Joanne Turner 19m
44. 44 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 8Read by Joanne Turner 2m
45. 45 Chapter 9. The Bubble, "A Credit-induced Boom"Read by Joanne Turner 15m
46. 46 Mortgage Fraud: Crime-facilitative environmentsRead by Joanne Turner 22m
47. 47 Disclosure and due diligence: A Quality Control Issue in the FactoryRead by Joanne Turner 24m
48. 48 Regulators: markets will always self-correctRead by Joanne Turner 14m
49. 49 Leveraged Loans and Commercial Real Estate: You've Got to Get Up and DanceRead by Joanne Turner 11m
50. 50 Lehman: From Moving to StorageRead by Joanne Turner 7m
51. 51 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Two Stark ChoicesRead by Joanne Turner 11m
52. 52 2006: Increase Our Penetration into Subprime. 2007: Moving deeper into the credit poolRead by Joanne Turner 12m
53. 53 Affordable housing goals: "GSEs cried bloody murder forever." The impact of the goalsRead by Joanne Turner 17m
54. 54 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 9Read by Joanne Turner 1m
55. 55 Ch. 10. CDO Managers: "We Are Not A Rent-A-Manager"Read by Joanne Turner 9m
56. 56 Ch. 10. Credit Default Swaps: "Dumb Question"Read by Joanne Turner 24m
57. 57 Citigroup: "I Do Not Believe We Were Powerless"Read by Joanne Turner 18m
58. 58 AIG: "I'm Not Getting Paid Enough to Stand on These Tracks"Read by Joanne Turner 8m
59. 59 Merrill Lynch: "Whatever It Takes"Read by Joanne Turner 12m
60. 60 Regulators: "Are Undue Concentrations of Risk Developing?"Read by Joanne Turner 7m
61. 61 Moody's: "It Was All About Revenue"Read by Joanne Turner 23m
62. 62 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 10Read by Joanne Turner 2m
63. 63 Ch. 11. The Bust. Delinquencies: "The Turn of the Housing Market"Read by Joanne Turner 29m
64. 64 Ch. 11. Rating Downgrades: "Never Before"Read by Joanne Turner 8m
65. 65 Ch. 11. CDOs: "Climbing the Wall of Subprime Lending"Read by Joanne Turner 4m
66. 66 Ch. 11. Legal Remedies: "On the Basis of the Information"Read by Joanne Turner 10m
67. 67 Ch. 11. Losses: "Who Owns Residential Credit Risk?"Read by Joanne Turner 13m
68. 68 Commission Conclusions on Ch. 11Read by Joanne Turner 2m
69. 69 Early 2007: Spreading Subprime WorriesRead by Joanne Turner 7m
70. 70 Ch. 12. Goldman: Let's be AggressiveRead by Joanne Turner 13m
71. 71 Bear Stearns's Hedge FundsRead by Joanne Turner 16m
72. 72 Rating AgenciesRead by Joanne Turner 4m
73. 73 AIG: Well BiggerRead by Joanne Turner 7m
74. 74 Commission Conclusions on Ch. 12Read by Joanne Turner 0m
75. 75 Chapter 13 Summer 2007: Disruptions in Funding IntroRead by Cbteddy 2m
76. 76 Ch 13 IKB of Germany "Real Money Investors"Read by Cbteddy 5m
77. 77 Ch 13 Countrywide: "That's our 9/11"Read by Cbteddy 8m
78. 78 Ch 13 BNP Paribas: "The ringing of the bells"Read by Cbteddy 4m
79. 79 Ch 13 SIVs: "An Oasis of Calm"Read by Cbteddy 4m
80. 80 Ch 13 Money funds and other investors: "Drink[ing] from a fire hose"Read by Cbteddy 6m
81. 81 Commission conclusions on Chapter 13Read by Cbteddy 1m
82. 82 Chapter 14 Late 2007 to early 2008: Billions in subprime losses (Intro)Read by mpinedag 2m
83. 83 Ch 14 Merrill Lynch: "Dawining awareness over the course of the summer"Read by mpinedag 11m
84. 84 Ch 14 Citigroup: "That would not in any way have excited my attention"Read by mpinedag 22m
85. 85 Ch 14 AIG's dispute with Goldman: "There could never be losses"Read by mpinedag 32m
86. 86 Ch 14 Federal Reserve: "The discount window wasn't working"Read by mpinedag 7m
87. 87 Ch 14 Monoline Insurers: "We never expected losses"Read by mpinedag 9m
88. 88 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 14Read by mpinedag 1m
89. 89 Chapter 15 March 2008: The fall of Bear Stearns (Intro)Read by Cbteddy 3m
90. 90 Ch 15 "I requested some forbearance"Read by Cbteddy 4m
91. 91 Ch 15 "We were suitably skeptical"Read by Cbteddy 3m
92. 92 Ch 15 "Turn into a death spiral"Read by Cbteddy 9m
93. 93 Ch 15 "Duty to protect their investors"Read by Cbteddy 11m
94. 94 Ch 15 "The Government would not permit a higher number"Read by Cbteddy 4m
95. 95 Ch 15 "It was heading to a black hole"Read by Cbteddy 2m
96. 96 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 15Read by Cbteddy 1m
97. 97 Chapter 16 March to August 2008: Systemic Risk Concerns (Intro)Read by mpinedag 2m
98. 98 Ch 16 The Federal Reserve: "When people got scared"Read by mpinedag 8m
99. 99 Ch 16 JP Morgan: "Refusing to unwind...would be unforgiveable"Read by mpinedag 5m
100. 100 Ch 16 The Fed and the SEC: "Weak liquidity position"Read by mpinedag 7m
101. 101 Ch 16 Derivatives: "Early stages of assessing the potential systemic risk"Read by mpinedag 7m
102. 102 Ch 16 Banks: "The markets were really, really dicey"Read by mpinedag 26m
103. 103 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 16Read by mpinedag 1m
104. 104 Chapter 17 September 2008: The takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Intro)Read by Cbteddy 3m
105. 105 Ch 17 "A good time to buy"Read by Cbteddy 5m
106. 106 Ch 17 "The only game in town"Read by Cbteddy 3m
107. 107 Ch 17 "It's a time game...be cool"Read by Cbteddy 6m
108. 108 Ch 17 "The idea strikes me as perverse"Read by Cbteddy 3m
109. 109 Ch 17 "It will increase confidence"Read by Cbteddy 8m
110. 110 Ch 17 "Critical unsafe and unsound practices"Read by Cbteddy 6m
111. 111 Ch 17 "They went from zero to three with no warning in between"Read by Cbteddy 7m
112. 112 Ch 17 "The worst-run financial institution"Read by Cbteddy 3m
113. 113 Ch 17 "Wasn't done at my pay grade"Read by Cbteddy 1m
114. 114 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 17Read by Cbteddy 2m
115. 115 Chapter 18 September 2008: The bankruptcy of Lehman (Intro)Read by mpinedag 4m
116. 116 Ch 18 "Get more conservatively funded"Read by mpinedag 7m
117. 117 Ch 18 "This is not sounding good at all"Read by mpinedag 3m
118. 118 Ch 18 "Spook the market"Read by mpinedag 11m
119. 119 Ch 18 "Imagination hat"Read by mpinedag 8m
120. 120 Ch 18 "Heads of family"Read by mpinedag 3m
121. 121 Ch 18 "Tell those sons of bitches to unwind"Read by mpinedag 3m
122. 122 Ch 18 "This doesn't seem like it is going to end pretty"Read by mpinedag 8m
123. 123 Ch 18 "The only alternative was that Lehman had to fail"Read by mpinedag 3m
124. 124 Ch 18 "A calamity"Read by mpinedag 12m
125. 125 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 18Read by mpinedag 2m
126. 126 Chapter 19 September 2008: The bailout of AIG (Intro)Read by Cbteddy 5m
127. 127 Ch 19 "Current liquidity position is precarious"Read by Cbteddy 6m
128. 128 Ch 19 "Spillover effect"Read by Cbteddy 10m
129. 129 Ch 19 "Like a gnat on an elephant"Read by Cbteddy 5m
130. 130 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 19Read by Cbteddy 3m
131. 131 Chapter 20 Crisis and Panic (Intro)Read by mpinedag 7m
132. 132 Ch 20 Money market funds: "Dealers weren't even picking up their phones"Read by mpinedag 10m
133. 133 Ch 20 Morgan Stanley: "Now we're the next in line"Read by mpinedag 13m
134. 134 Ch 20 Over-the-counter derivatives "A grinding halt"Read by mpinedag 6m
135. 135 Ch 20 Washington Mutual "It's yours"Read by mpinedag 4m
136. 136 Ch 20 Wachovia "At the front end of teh dominoes as other dominoes fell"Read by mpinedag 18m
137. 137 Ch 20 TARP "Comprehensive approach"Read by mpinedag 18m
138. 138 Ch 20 AIG "We needed to stop the sucking chest wound in this patient"Read by mpinedag 10m
139. 139 Ch 20 Citigroup "Let the world know we will not pull a Lehman"Read by mpinedag 11m
140. 140 Ch 20 Bank of America "A shotgun wedding"Read by mpinedag 13m
141. 141 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 20Read by mpinedag 2m
142. 142 Chapter 21 The Economic Fallout (Intro)Read by Cbteddy 4m
143. 143 Ch 21 Households "I'm not eating, I'm not sleeping"Read by Cbteddy 12m
144. 144 Ch 21 Businesses "Squirrels storing nuts"Read by Cbteddy 9m
145. 145 Ch 21 Commercial real estate: "Nothing's moving"Read by Cbteddy 5m
146. 146 Ch 21 Government: "State struggled to close shortfalls"Read by Cbteddy 8m
147. 147 Ch 21 The financial sector: "Almost triple the level of three years earlier"Read by Cbteddy 3m
148. 148 Ch 22 Foreclosures on the rise: "Hard to talk about any recovery"Read by mpinedag 6m
149. 149 Ch 22 Initiatives to stem foreclosures "Persistently disregard"Read by mpinedag 6m
150. 150 Ch 22 Flaws in the process: "Speculation and worst-case scenarios"Read by mpinedag 5m
151. 151 Ch 22 Neighborhood effects: "I'm not leaving"Read by mpinedag 5m
152. 152 Commission Conclusions on Chapter 22Read by mpinedag 1m
153. 153 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - IntroRead by Cbteddy 1m
154. 154 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - How our approach differs from others?Read by Cbteddy 7m
155. 155 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Stages of the crisisRead by Cbteddy 2m
156. 156 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The ten essential causes of the financial and economic crisisRead by Cbteddy 6m
157. 157 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The credit bubble: global capita flows, underpriced risk, and Federal Reserve policyRead by Cbteddy 8m
158. 158 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The housing bubbleRead by Cbteddy 8m
159. 159 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Turning bad mortgages into toxic financial assetsRead by Cbteddy 7m
160. 160 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Big bank bets and why banks failedRead by Cbteddy 9m
161. 161 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - Two types of systemic failureRead by Cbteddy 13m
162. 162 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The shock and panicRead by Cbteddy 6m
163. 163 Dissenting Statement - Causes of the financial and economic crisis - The system freezingRead by Cbteddy 3m
164. 164 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IntroRead by mpinedag 23m
165. 165 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - SummaryRead by mpinedag 7m
166. 166 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 1. Government policies resulted in an unprecedented number of risky mortgagesRead by mpinedag 15m
167. 167 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 2. The great housing bubble and its effectsRead by mpinedag 13m
168. 168 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 3. Delinquency rates on nontraditional mortgagesRead by mpinedag 4m
169. 169 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 4. The origin and growth of subprime PMBSRead by mpinedag 7m
170. 170 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 5. What was known about NTMs prior to the crisis?Read by mpinedag 17m
171. 171 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - 6. ConclusionRead by mpinedag 4m
172. 172 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - IntroRead by Cbteddy 3m
173. 173 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - How failures among NTMs were transmitted to the financial systemRead by Cbteddy 3m
174. 174 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - II. How 27 million NTMS precipitated a financial crisis - The defaults beginRead by Cbteddy 34m
175. 175 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - IntroRead by Cbteddy 9m
176. 176 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 1. HUD's central roleRead by Cbteddy 7m
177. 177 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 2. The decline of mortgage underwriting standardsRead by Cbteddy 35m
178. 178 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSERead by mpinedag 27m
179. 179 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 3. The affordable housing goals were the sole reason that the GSERead by mpinedag 28m
180. 180 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 4. Competition between the GSEs and FHA for subprime and alt-a moRead by mpinedag 10m
181. 181 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 5. Enlisting mortgage bankers and subprime lenders in affordable Read by mpinedag 5m
182. 182 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - III. The US government's role in fostering the growth of the NTM market - 6. The community reinvestment actRead by mpinedag 22m
183. 183 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission - Dissenting Statement - IV. ConclusionRead by mpinedag 2m

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